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Abstract 
This dissertation outlines the multidimensional concept of security of supply in the EU 
based on international literature. Initially, the concept of the term is being investigated, 
accompanied by a thorough analysis of the energy state of the EU, which depicts the 
significant dependency of EU in external suppliers. Subsequently, geopolitical aspect of 
energy is being addressed, more specifically the case of gas, to stress the complex nature 
of energy. Following, the legal framework and policy of the EU on energy issues is being 
presented, as being the EU’s tool to tackle all the aforementioned issues, while particular 
emphasis is given to technology as a way of moving towards security of supply. Finally, 
the key points of the dissertation are summed up to provide a brief yet comprehensive 
view of the topic. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Concept of Security of Energy Supply 
Energy is of paramount importance for every country’s modern lifestyle and economy. It 
is such an integral part of our everyday lives, that it’s an undeniable fact for most people 
that pumps shall always have fuels to move their cars, that with the push of button their 
homes shall be heated and their appliances shall be operating without any possibility of 
disruptions or unavailability. Additionally, all this energy is expected to be affordable 
price wise. 
 That fact describes in essence the concept of “security of energy supply” or “energy 
security”, as defined by IEA. More specifically, the IEA describes energy security as “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”  [1], which is a brief 
yet comprehensive interpretation of the concept (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Energy security concept [IEA] 
Energy security, though, is a far multidimensional concept, depending on the angle of 
study. As regards the time aspect of energy security for example, IEA distinct the concept 
in: “long-term energy security which mainly deals with timely investments to supply en-
ergy in line with economic developments and sustainable environmental needs” and 
“short-term energy security that focuses on the ability of the energy system to react 
promptly to sudden changes within the supply-demand balance”. Another distinction that 
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can be found in the literature is the economic/political perspectives, with the first imply-
ing that energy issues are subject solely to market operation, therefore supply, demand 
and prices are regulated on their own without political intervention, and the later support-
ing that energy security is a matter of national security, due to the increasing nationaliza-
tion and politicization of energy resources. 
1.2 Dissertation Scope 
Based on the multi-lateral aspect of security of energy supply, the scope of this thesis 
is to analyze how the EU addresses this topic of different levels. Chapter 2 contains an 
in-depth analysis of the current EU energy state, in terms of production, consumption, 
imports of primary energy sources and energy products for final use, in order to provide 
a clear picture of EU dependence on imports. Chapter 3 presents the geopolitical aspects 
of energy issues in the case of gas, so as to highlight the complexity on assessing energy 
issues and forming efficient strategies and partnerships. Gas have been chosen for this 
analysis, as it is the energy source most heavily promoted in the EU and due to its infra-
structure sensitivity. Chapter 4 provides a thorough look on EU legal framework on en-
ergy, by analyzing the actors participating in forming EU legislation, presenting EU leg-
islation progression though the years and finally summing up presenting the relevant to 
energy security existing and forthcoming EU policy, which in fact is the strategy of the 
EU. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the potential contribution of technology to EU’s energy 
security strategy. Several energy technologies are being analyzed, emphasizing on the 
next steps necessary to enhance their efficiency and cost, while also agreed targets be-
tween the members of the SET Plan Steering Group regarding those technologies’ pro-
gress are being stated. Finally, chapter 6 concludes all the aforementioned topics, provid-
ing the key points of this dissertation. 
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2 EU Energy State 
This chapter aims to present the current energy state of the European Union and its cor-
responding energy import dependency, while focusing on each energy source and energy 
product separately in terms on consumption, production, and imports. 
In order to have a clear view of the energy flow within the EU, its basic form is de-
picted in Figure 2. Input consists of both indigenous production and imports. Part of the 
energy inserted is directly carried-over, while the rest is being transformed and refined to 
be used in various appliances. Notably, a fraction of the available energy is also being 
exported. 
All data illustrated and commented in this chapter are extracted from the official en-
ergy datasheet of the European Commission [2], which is based on Eurostat’s surveys 
regarding the energy profile of the EU and all its Member States. Data is available until 
the year 2014, with the next official update estimated in February 2017. 
2.1 Consumption 
2.1.1 All energy sources 
Energy consumption is a complex concept with many aspects. Several energy consump-
tion indicators can be used to serve different needs when examining energy trends and 
issues. As far as European Union’s energy dependence is concerned, two indicators shall 
be examined, gross inland energy consumption and final energy consumption. 
According to Eurostat [3] gross inland energy consumption (also known as total pri-
mary energy supply) is the total energy demand of a country or region. It represents the 
quantity of primary energy necessary to cover inland consumption of a certain area. The 
difference between gross inland energy consumption and gross energy consumption is 
that in gross energy consumption the transformation output (electricity or heat produced 
from other energy sources) is included, meaning that gross energy consumption is a prod-
uct-specific consumption and does not reflect the demand for primary energy. (primary 
production+imports-exports-bunkers)
-12- 
 
 
Figure 2: European Union energy balance flow [Eurostat]
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On the other hand, final energy consumption represents the total energy consumed by 
end users, such as households, industry and agriculture. It is the energy which reaches the 
final consumer's door and excludes that which is used by the energy sector itself. Final 
energy covers quantities consumed by private households, commerce, public administra-
tion, services, agriculture, industry, road transport, air transport (aviation), other transport 
(rail, inland navigation), services, other. 
 
Figure 3:EU gross inland and final energy consumption 1990-2014 [mtoe] 
The examination of statistical data regarding EU’s gross inland energy consumption 
though the last two decades lead to two opposite trends divided in time, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. Gross inland energy consumption had been inclining during 1990-2005, mostly 
due to the economic growth that the European Union was experiencing. On the contrary, 
after 2006 and till 2014 there was a substantial decline in consumption figures. The global 
financial and economic crisis is considered to be one of the major causes behind this swift, 
while the pattern of energy consumption is considered to be practically unaltered. Nota-
bly, after almost 10 years of consecutive falling figures, 2014’s gross inland consumption 
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dropped below the respective figure of 1990, which is the start of the available time series. 
Compared to the peak of 2005, gross inland consumption of 2014 was 12,3% lower.  
The corresponding figure of  EU-28’s final energy consumption during the same time 
frame of 1990-2014 confirms the general trend on the first hand, but also denotes the 
difference between the two energy consumption indicators on the other. Comparing the 
figures during 2011-2014, it is clear that final energy consumption seems to be stable, 
while gross inland energy consumption illustrates a fall of 1,8%. Generally, EU-28 final 
energy was equivalent of almost 2/3 of gross inland consumption during the available 
time series. 
As denoted in Table 1, six counties account for 70% of EU-28’s energy consumption 
of 2014, the top of which is Germany with a share of almost 20%. France and the United 
Kingdom follow with a cumulative share of 25%, while Italy, Spain and Poland account 
for another 20%. The sum of Netherlands’, Belgium and Sweden consumption is 
approximately 10%, which leads to the fact that the rest 19 countries of EU-28 account 
only for 10% of the total share. 
Table 1:EU member states’ share on energy consumption 
 Gross inland energy     
consumption (%) 
Final energy                        
consumption (%) 
Germany 19,5 
69,3 
19,7 
69,2 
France 15,5 13,4 
United Kingdom 11,8 12,2 
Italy 9,4 10,7 
Spain 7,3 7,5 
Poland 5,9 5,8 
Netherlands 4,8 
11,1 
4,5 
10,6 Belgium 3,3 3,2 
Sweden 3,0 2,9 
 
As illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, half of EU-28 countries appear to have reduced their 
gross inland energy consumption during the timeframe under consideration, while on the 
contrary the other half have increased theirs. It is interesting to note that both groups 
consist of both large and small consumers. 
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Table 2:EU member states which reduced gross inland energy consumption from 1990 to 2014 
  
Table 3:EU member states which increased gross inland energy consumption from 1990 to 2014 
 Gross inland energy consumption 
 1990 
(mtoe) 
2014 
(mtoe) 
2014 to 
1990 (%) 
Share in 
2014 (%) 
Total Share 
in 2014 (%) 
France 227,8 248,5 9% 15,5 
57.6 
Spain 90,1 116,7 30% 7,3 
Netherlands 66,7 76,8 15% 4,8 
Belgium 48,6 53,4 10% 3,3 
Sweden 47,4 48,2 2% 3,0 
Finland 28,8 34,6 20% 2,2 
Austria 25,0 32,7 31% 2,0 
Greece 22,3 24,4 9% 1,5 
Portugal 18,2 22,1 21% 1,4 
Ireland 10,3 13,6 32% 0,8 
Slovenia 5,7 6,7 17% 0,4 
Luxembourg 3,5 4,2 20% 0,3 
Cyprus 1,6 2,2 38% 0,1 
Malta 0,6 0,9 52% 0,1 
 
The energy mix forming the above figures of gross inland energy consumption during 
1990-204 is depicted in Figure 4. Overall, there was a gradual incline in the share of 
renewables and gas, while petroleum products and solid fuels lost a significant part of 
their share in European Union’s energy mix. Regarding the cumulative share of petroleum 
products and solid fuels, there was a substantial loss in shares of 14,5% between 
 Gross inland energy consumption  
 1990 
(mtoe) 
2014 
(mtoe) 
2014 to 
1990 (%) 
Share in 
2014 (%) 
Total Share 
in 2014 (%) 
Germany 356,3 313,0 -12% 19,5 
42.6 
United Kingdom 210,6 189,3 -10% 11,8 
Italy 153,5 151,0 -2% 9,4 
Poland 103,3 94,3 -9% 5,9 
Czech Republic 49,9 41,5 -17% 2,6 
Romania 58,1 32,3 -44% 2,0 
Hungary 28,8 22,8 -21% 1,4 
Bulgaria 27,6 17,7 -36% 1,1 
Denmark 17,9 16,9 -6% 1,1 
Slovakia 21,8 16,2 -26% 1,0 
Croatia 9,5 8,2 -14% 0,5 
Estonia 9,9 6,7 -32% 0,4 
Lithuania 15,9 6,7 -58% 0,4 
Latvia 7,9 4,5 -44% 0,3 
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1990(65%) and 2013(50.5%), which reflects the move to more environmentally 
conscious era. It is also important to note that the minor incline in 2014 was probably due 
to low oil prices during that period. By contrast, the corresponding shares of renewable 
energy and gas appear to have an almost gradual increase through the timeframe 
examined. Renewable energy sources used to account for only 4,3% back in 1990, while 
their corresponding share in 2014 is approximately 3 times higher (12,5%), with a steady 
inclining trend Respectively, gas’ share in 1990 was 17,9%, while in 2014 was 21,4%. 
However, gas’s peak was in 2010 with a share of 25,4%, a fact that evokes questions 
regarding the ease of gas supply after 2010. As for the nuclear energy, its contribution 
peaked in 2002(14,5%) and then its share remained relatively unaltered till 2014(14,1%), 
while it appears to be the most stable fuel regarding its contribution during 1990-2014. 
 
Figure 4:EU gross inland consumption per energy product 1990-2014 [%] 
As for final energy consumption development per energy product, which is illustrated 
in Figure 5, the shares between energy products are relatively more stable than the ones 
of gross energy consumption. Petroleum products dominate the shares with an average of 
42% during 1990-2014. The last decade there was a declining trend which ended in 40% 
in 2014. Gas was also steady during the examined timeframe with an average of 23%, 
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having the second larger share after petroleum products. Gas’ share was 22% in 2014. 
The same applies for electricity regarding 2014 share. Electricity was one of two products 
with continuous inclining figures during the years. In the beginning of 1990 its share was 
17%, in the mid 2000 it had raised to 20%, ending up in 22% in 2014.Rewneables, as in 
the case of gross final consumption, appear to have to most drastic change over the years, 
having doubled its share from 1990 to 2014, from 4% to 8%. Solid fuels and derived heat 
account for another 4% each on the final consumption energy mix. 
 
Figure 5: EU final consumption per energy product 1990-2014 [%] 
A further analysis of the final energy consumption in 2014 depicts three major sector 
dominating end usage, as shown in Figure 6. The highest consumer sector is transport 
(33,2%), followed by industry (25,9%) and households (24,8 %). The rest 16,1% comes 
from services, agriculture and forestry and other. Figure 7 confirms the cumulative fig-
ures, illustrating the quantitative shares of final energy consumption per sector per 
country.  
-18- 
Transport covers the energy used for all transport activities. The main part of transport 
sectors consumptions comes from road use (energy used for the propulsion of road 
vehicles). It is important to note that 94% of transport energy use comes from petroleum 
products, while 4% is covers by renewables in 2014. Industry sectors uses mostly gas 
(32%) and electrical energy(31%). Solid fuels and total petroleum products account for 
23%, while renewables use is 7%. Residential use appears to have a more or less common 
fuel segmentation with the industry. Gas (35%) and electrical energy (28%) are the most 
used. Renewable energy follows (15%), a bit higher than total petroleum products (13%). 
The renewable energy used from the residential sector is higher than the cumulative 
renewable energy used in both transport and industry sectors. 
Figure 6:EU final energy use per sector[%] 
 
Figure 7: Final energy use per sector per country [%] 
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2.1.2 Analysis per energy source 
2.1.2.1 Total petroleum products 
As total petroleum products about 34% of gross inland consumption, oil remains the prin-
cipal fuel in the EU energy mix. If considered a unified country, the EU is the second 
biggest consumer with a portion of 15%, following the USA [4]. The largest consumer of 
oil in the EU is transportation, followed by the petrochemical industry. Its use in power 
generation and heating has declined significantly throughout the years. There are special 
cases though, like Cyprus and Malta, in which petroleum products are the main fuel for 
power generation. Generally, total petroleum products consumption in the EU has demon-
strated a declining inclination which has advanced due to the financial crisis in 2008. 
Consumption has diminished by 12,9% since 2005 (average -2,0%/year) as well as by 
10,5% since 2008 (average -3,0%/year). 
 Following 2005, a decrease in total petroleum products consumption has been 
reported throughout most of Europe. There are only four Member States (Finland, Greece, 
Poland and Sweden) that have shown a rise of crude oil consumption between 2004 and 
2014. The decrease was especially abrupt in Croatia, France and Romania, countries in 
which crude oil consumption declined by more than 30% in the period 2004-2014.  
2.1.2.2 Natural gas 
The need for gas in the EU before the crisis began was around 450mtoe. The consumption 
of gas in 2014 deteriorated below 350mtoe, which was the lowest levels since the start of 
the 21st century. Germany and the UK are the biggest consumers of gas, while other 
important consumers are Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and France.  
Most of the gas is being consumed in households (108mtoe) and in electricity pro-
duction (107mtoe), more than half of which (59mtoe) is utilized as input in CHP plants. 
Nearly 19% of the electricity produced in the EU originates from gas and for several 
Member States the portion of gas in electricity production is considerable (>40% in the 
Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Lithuania and Ireland). In respect of non-household con-
sumers, services consume 43,5mtoe, when in fact the greatest industrial consumers are 
parts of chemical and petrochemical industries, generation of non-metallic minerals, food 
as well as tobacco production. Generally, 25% of gas is consumed by the industry, 40% 
on final use and 30% for electricity production and CHP input.   
-20- 
2.1.2.3 Solid fuels 
EU is the third biggest consumer of solid fuels after China and North. Demand for solid 
fuels in the EU was plummeted by 20% in the period between 1995 and 2014 and that 
accounts for all Member States. After the recession in consumption in 2009, demand be-
gan rebounding and 2012 was the fourth year in a row of higher solid fuels consumption. 
However, consumption remains to lower than pre-recession levels and undeniably at ap-
proximately 15% lower than 90’s level. Approximately 70% of solid fuels is utilized as 
transformation input to CHP, electricity and regional heating plants.  
 The UK, Poland and Germany continue being the biggest consumers of solid fuels, 
leading in 2014 to a consumption increased by 4% on a yearly basis in Germany, up by 
27% in the UK, and reduced by 4% in Poland. Numerous Member States have shown a 
double-digit rise in consumption in the period 2011-2012, notably Portugal (+33%), 
Spain (+23%), France (+12%), Ireland (+16%) and the Netherlands (+10%), despite the 
fact that consumption is still below post-crisis levels. The fall in coal and carbon dioxide 
prices and the increased gas prices guaranteed provide a powerful competitive advantage 
to coal against gas for use in power generation. 
2.1.2.4 Nuclear energy 
Electricity production dominate nuclear consumption, with 131 nuclear power plants in 
the EU (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Germany Hungary, the Neth-
erlands, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom) in 2014 
and another 4 being under construction in Slovakia, Finland and France. Approximately 
30% of electricity produced in the EU accounts to nuclear power plants. Nuclear con-
sumption for electricity production presented an inclining trend of 23% during 1990-
2004, while during the last decade of 2004-2014 there was a decrease of 13,1%. Conse-
quently, consumption peaked in 2004 with 260,3mtoe and gradually declined to 226,1 in 
2014.  
2.1.2.5 Renewable energy 
Renewables presented a boom during the last decade in the EU energy mix. As regards 
gross inland energy consumption, there are numerous Member States with a significant 
share of renewables, such as Iceland(86.3 %), Norway(44.8 %), Latvia(36,2%), Swe-
den(35,8%), Austria(30%), Finland(29,4%), Denmark(26,2%) and Portugal(25%). The 
case for final energy consumptions is almost similar with Finland, Latvia and Sweden 
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having more than one third from renewables. Sweden in particular is covered more than 
half (52,6%) of its final energy needs by renewables. 
 More than one fourth of gross electricity consumption in 2014 was due to renewables, 
with Austria(70%) and Sweden(63,3%) being the top Member States in this respect, 
mostly using solid biofuels and hydropower. The corresponding figure for the transport 
sector was almost 6% in 2014, with Finland(19,2%) and Sweden(19,2%) having the high-
est shares. 
2.1.2.6 Refined products 
Refining plays a significant role in transforming crude oil as well as other feedstock into 
oil products for final use. Transportation is the sector dominating refined oil and oil 
products consumption with a share of 64%, 83% of which accounts to road transport and 
15% to aviation. Industry uses 22% and residential, agriculture and services utilize 14%. 
 The trend has been declining for all refined products since 2009. The total drop was 
8% in 2014 and was mainly due to the reduction of gasoline(-17%), gasoil(-3%) and 
kerosene(-3%) consumption. Tax policies, implying lower fares in diesel, have shifted 
transportation sector form gasoline to diesel, which is the most significant change in EU 
refined products pattern thought the years.  
2.1.2.7 Electricity 
Electricity consumption had been increasing during the last years. In 2014, 26% of con-
sumption account on industry, 33% on transport and 41% on residential use and services, 
with the trend being generally inclining for all sectors. 
 During the last 10 years, residential consumption of electricity decreased by 1,3%, 
mainly due to new generation efficient appliances and demographic issues, as the number 
of people living in households. Significant reductions occurred in Belgium(28,6%), Swe-
den and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, other Member States increased their 
consumption. Typical examples are Romania(48%), Lithuania(27%), Spain(22% and 
Bulgaria(21%). 
-22- 
2.2 Production 
2.2.1 All energy sources 
Production of primary energy in the EU-28 was 771 mtoe in 2014. As illustrated in Figure 
8, production was steadily declining during the examined timeframe of the last decade, 
with only one exception in 2010, when there was a slight rebound. Generally, production 
fell 17.3 % from 2004 until 2014. The examination of earlier data depicts that production 
level had peaked in 1997 with approximately 990mtoe, after which the trend is steadily 
declining, concluding in the lowest level of 2014, which is the lowest since 1990. 
 
Figure 8: EU energy production 2004-2014 [mtoe] 
In 2014, the highest primary energy producer in EU-28 was France with a 17.6 % 
share, followed by Germany with 15.6 % and the United Kingdom with 14.0 %. 
Examining the figures one decade earlier, the situation for most counties is fairly the same 
+-15%. However, two countries, the United Kingdom and Denmark appear to have 
decreased their production in half during 2004-2014. On the other hand, there are also 
some countries that increased their production significantly, those being Italy and Austria 
by almost 1/4 and Portugal and Estonia by more than half. 
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Figure 9: Development of energy sources share in EU production 2004-2014 [%] 
In 2014, almost a quarter of EU-28’s energy production was accounted to renewable 
energy sources, higher than all other energy sources apart from nuclear. Solid fuels 
accounted only for 19,4%, with natural gas coming next with a share of 15,2%. Crude oil 
complement the energy mix with 9.1%. 
Renewables’ aggressive integration into EU-28’ energy production mix during the 
last years is the most significant change in the way the EU approaches the issue of security 
of supply. As depicted in Figure 9, renewables’ share rose by 73,1% over the examined 
period, while crude oil, natural gas and other solid fuels fell by 52%, 42,9% and 25,5% 
correspondingly. Even nuclear energy, which has the biggest share in the energy mix, fell 
by 13,1%. 
2.2.2 Analysis per energy source 
2.2.2.1 Total petroleum products 
In total 20 members of EU-28 produce total petroleum products, the biggest of which is 
the United Kingdom with a production of 41mtoe. Denmark and Italy follow with 8 and 
6,1mtoe correspondingly. Romania, Germany, Ukraine and the Netherlands produce from 
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2 to 4mtoe of total petroleum products, while the rest 13 producer counties account for 
less than 1mtoe. 
2.2.2.2 Natural gas 
EU production dropped over the last years from 200mtoe in the late 90's to less than 120 
mtoe in 2014. The greatest producer of gas in 2014 in the EU are the Netherlands with 
almost 60mtoe. Generation of the UK sunk to the level of 35mtoe in 2014, comparing to 
more than 90mtoe in the start of the decade. Exports are mainly towards Turkey, 
Switzerland and the Balkan area, representing a fraction less than 20mtoe. 
EU’s gas reserves have been evaluated on the level of 1412 mtoe (1700 bcm) in 2012, 
translated in less than four years of complete EU consumption. Approximately 830mtoe 
are held by the Netherlands, followed by the United Kingdom with 166mtoe and finally 
each of Germany, Poland, Romania and Italy, hold 83mtoe. As a reference, Norway, a 
non-EU country but a country of the general European Economic Area(EEA), holds 1744 
mtoe. 
2.2.2.3 Solid Fuels 
EU is a major solid fuels producer, with 150mtoe in 2014, a figure which is though de-
creased compared to previous years. More specifically the production has been decreased 
by 40% compared to mid-1990s levels. When considering the biggest EU producers, the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Germany, their production has been reduced by 25%, 37% 
and 40%, correspondingly. However, the figures remain relatively unaltered during the 
last 2 years. 
2.2.2.4 Nuclear energy 
As mentioned above, nuclear plants are in operation in 13 Member States; France, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Finland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Sweden. The total production 
in 2014 was 226,1mtoe, with 2003 illustrating the highest production with 257mtoe. 
 The biggest nuclear power producer within the EU is France, almost covering 
half(49,8%) of EU’s total nuclear production. Germany is second(11%), followed by 
Sweden(7,5%), the United Kingdom(7,3%) and Spain(6,5%).  Most of the producing 
Member States have increased their production during 1990-2014, with Germany, Lithu-
ania, Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom being the only to lower their production. 
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2.2.2.5 Renewable energy 
EU’s production from renewable sources in 2014 was 196mtoe, which accounts for 
25,4% of the total primary energy production of the EU. Renewables share boomed dur-
ing 2004-2014 by 73,1%. The most significant source was renewable waste and solid 
biofuels with a share of 63% among all renewables production, only to be followed by 
hydropower with a share of 16,5%. Wind energy accounted for 11,1% , solar energy for 
6,1% and lastly geothermal with 3,2%. 
 Germany is EU’s bigger renewables producer(18,5%), with Italy being second(12%) 
and France third(10,7%). Spain(9,2%) and Sweden(8,5%) also have a considerable 
amount of renewables production.  Climatic conditions and natural formations have a 
pivotal role to play on renewables deployment, a fact that is clearly depicted in renewa-
bles fraction in different Member States’ energy mix. 
2.2.2.6 Refined products 
The EU, having 83 refineries and a production capacity of some 15 million barrels per 
day in 2012, which accounts for approximately 16% of international refining capacity, is 
the second biggest producer of oil products following the United States, while suffering 
from overcapacity. 
The feedback from numerous EU refining plants to the recent market situation and 
future signs is to have refineries available for sale or to stop operations for some small 
periods and/or transform their sites to terminals. Closures are mostly prevented due to the 
high costs of clean-up procedures. 
Even though there had been cut-offs in capacity of 1,8 million barrels per day in 
Europe since 2008, in accordance to the IEA, with regard to refinery terminations, 
transformation of refineries into import terminals or capacity diminishing. In spite of 
these cutbacks, it is considered that the area is still being tormented from overcapacity 
and that more refineries continue being at a risk of closing in the years to come. Depletion 
of capacity have a negative effect on supply security, as every refinery generates specific 
products that are essential from a security of supply standpoint. The final result is that the 
EU shall become more reliant on imports and on the relevant infrastructure. 
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2.2.2.7 Electricity 
EU’s electricity production in 2014 was 3,19TWh. The figures depict two trends, an in-
clining trend since 2008, when electricity generation peaked at 3,387TWh, and a declin-
ing one till 2014. 
 Germany is the biggest electricity producer (19,5%) in the EU, followed by 
France(17,8%) and the United Kingdom(10,6%). As regards the energy sources used, 
fossil fuels account for almost half of EU’s production(47,6%), followed by nu-
clear(27,4%), hydropower(13,2%), wind energy(8,3%) and solar energy(3,2%). 
2.3 Imports – Import Dependency 
2.3.1 All energy sources 
Imports as a term also has multiple interpretations. EU imports energy, but at the same 
time has exports too. In this study, the need is to reflect which part of the energy is actually 
used to serve final use. Therefore, when the term of imports is being used, it shall always 
reflect the term of net imports, which according to Eurostat, is the total imports minus the 
exports.  
 
Figure 10: EU net imports to production 2004-2014 [mtoe] 
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The deterioration in the leading production of hard coil, lignite, crude oil, natural gas, 
and currently nuclear energy has caused a situation where the European Union was pro-
gressively depending on basic energy imports so that they may meet demand, despite the 
fact that this situation was balanced in the outcome of the financial and economic crisis. 
As illustrated in Figure 10, net imports generally follow the trend of production, which 
of course goes along the corresponding trend of consumption-demand. In 2014, the im-
ports of basic energy, made by the EU-28, surpassed exports by some 881 mtoe. 
The greater net importers of energy were in general the most populated EU Member 
States, except for Poland (a country with some remaining domestic deposits of coal). 
Denmark was the sole net exporter of primary energy in 2013, amid the EU Member 
States. However, Danish energy imports surpassed exports in 2013, in a way that any 
other Member States that were net exporters of energy, no longer existed (see Table 2). 
In relation to the extent of the population, the greatest net importers were Luxembourg, 
Malta and Belgium in 2014. 
Between the 1980s and 2014, EU-28 reliance on energy imports has risen from less 
than 40% of gross energy utilization, to 53,5%, as illustrated in Figure 11. This more 
recent figure pointed a small decline in the dependency percentage, which in 2008 had 
peaked at 54,5%. In 2014, the most significant energy dependency rates were reported 
for crude oil (88,2%) as well as for natural gas (67,4%). The EU's reliance on countries 
that are not members of the EU, for supplies of natural gas, increased during the last 
decade (2004-2014) 13,8 percentage points, quicker than the advance in dependency for 
crude oil (7,5 percentage points) and solid fuels (7,4 percentage points). By 2004, the EU-
28's net imports concerning energy, have been more significant than its basic production; 
greater than half of EU's gross domestic energy consumption was provided by net im-
ports. 
As depicted in Figure 12, in 2014, the Member States that were the least reliant, were 
Estonia (8,9%), Denmark (12,8%) and Romania (17,0%), succeeded by Poland (28,6 %), 
the Czech Republic (30,4%), Sweden (32,0%), the Netherlands (33,8%) as well as 
Bulgaria (34,5%). On the contrary, the uppermost energy reliance rates were reported for 
Malta (97,7%), Luxemburg (96,6%), Cyprus (93,4%), Ireland (85,3%), Belgium (80,1%) 
and Lithuania (77,9%). Amidst the five Member States using up the greatest amounts of 
energy, the least reliant on energy imports were the U.K. (45,5%) and France (46,1%), in 
comparison with Germany (61,4%), Spain (72,9%) and Italy (75,9%). Additionally, it 
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should be stated that nine Member States reported in 2014, their most reduced energy 
dependency rates since 1990, those countries being: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, France, Romania and Portugal. On the contrary, the Czech Republic 
is the sole Member State reporting a top of its energy reliance in 2014.   
 
Figure 11:EU energy import dependency per member state 2014 [%] 
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2.3.2 Analysis per energy source 
2.3.2.1 Total petroleum products 
Reliance in import of crude oil, indicated as a percentage of consumption, kept on rising 
during the years reaching 88,2% in 2014, which is considered the peak level among fossil 
fuels, as illustrated in Figure 12, costing approximately €320billion per year. 
 
Figure 12: EU energy dependency rate per energy source 2004-2014 [%] 
Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Italy continue to be the biggest net import-
ers of crude oil, despite the fact that, except for Spain, the outright worth of net import 
declined in the aforementioned countries between 1995 and 2012. In 2014, one third of 
extra-Eu imports of crude oil and NGL derived from Russia, succeeded by Norway 
(13%), Nigeria(9%), Saudi Arabia (9%) and the rest from numerous countries, though 
with small proportions. 
 Even though the market for oil is liquid and global, there is a concentration of suppli-
ers that are exposed to geopolitical issues, resulting in possible disruption events or high 
prices. As regards its transportation, imported petroleum products are 90% carried by the 
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sea, making it easy and flexible to alter suppliers if needed. What is limiting though, is 
that most refineries are designed to process specific types of petroleum products. 
Most processing facilities are based on the coast, thus having direct connection to oil 
originating from producing countries of the globe. Regional inland processing facilities 
au contraire, are commonly supplied by the Druzhba pipeline with oil deriving directly 
from Russia. The specific pipeline distributes about 50 million tons of oil per year, nearly 
30% of the entire Russian imports to the EU.  
2.3.2.2 Gas 
Gas imports are 60% higher compared to the corresponding demand. The largest net im-
porters of gas are the greatest EU economies including Germany and Italy. In the last 
decade, net imports to Italy and Germany have been comparably balanced (in 2012 low-
ered by 8% and 12% correspondingly from the top in 2006). The UK turned into a net 
importer in 2004 with import volumes rising thirty-fold in less than a ten-year period to 
reach 31mtoe in 2012. Denmark and the Netherlands are net exporters of natural gas. In 
2014, 38% of imported gas derived from Russia, succeeded by Norway (32%), Alge-
ria(12%), Qatar (9%) and numerous more countries but with very limited capacity. 
The level of reliance and diversification of suppliers and supply roads are significantly 
diverse among Member States. A number of northern and eastern Member States rely on 
a sole supplier, and frequently on one supply road, for their complete natural gas con-
sumption, when at the same time other Member States have a well set portfolio of import 
partners.  
 Gas is an energy source that has characteristics that distincts it from the other sources. 
The most important features is that is mainly transported though fixed pipelines that cre-
ate a direct and firm inter-dependence between the producers and the consumers. Another 
important note is that gas reserves are highly nationalized and concentrated in specific 
regions, thus no global gas market exists. The combination of those facts make gas a 
source extensively used as political leverage. A full detailed view on gas geopolitical role 
is analyzed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2.3 Solid fuels 
The EU is the third biggest consumer Hard coals imports to the EU are flourishing in 
order to make up for the decrease in domestic coal generation and satisfy the current rise 
in demand by power services set in motion by the drop in coal import prices and the 
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competitive spot of coal in the power sector. Overall imports in 2014 rose at a faster pace 
compared to consumption. Russia continues to be the most significant exporter of solid 
fuels to the EU consisting up to 29% of imports to the EU, with Columbia (21%) and the 
US (20,5%) following in its steps. Supplies coming from Columbia and the United States 
have taken the place of imports from Indonesia and South Africa, while Australian im-
ports have been replaced by North American competition.  
Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy are the biggest EU importers of coal. In the period 
2011-2012, there has been a drop in hard coal net imports to Germany since higher con-
sumption was met by flourishing domestic generation and less stock building.  
When compared to other fossil fuels, the dependence of the EU on net imports of solid 
fuels coming from countries outside the EEA is relatively low, despite the fact that it has 
doubled since the mid-90s and has been higher 40% in the late years, following a peak at 
45% in 2008. Hard coal comprises practically the total of solid fuel imports to the EU. 
This is due to the fact that solid fuels markets are very competitive and diversified. As a 
result, nor disruptions, nor spice spikes have been observed in the solid fuels market, in 
contrast to the relevant global oil markets and the regional gas markets. Lastly, solid fuels 
transportation is flexible, as both railroad, pipelines, trucks or ship can be used. 
2.3.2.4 Nuclear 
Indigenous mining of uranium and its processing accounts for approximately 5% of the 
EU needs, meaning that the EU is highly reliant on imports. Even though the actual de-
pendency of uranium is significant, it is supplied through numerous supplier countries. 
Kazakhstan is the biggest supplier accounting for 21,2% of EU’s uranium supplies, fol-
lowed by Canada(18,5%), Russia(18,1%), Niger(13,1%), Australia(11,8%) and others. 
Some of EU’s uranium import partners as Canada and Australia are long term and reliant 
cooperators, further reducing risks. 
Dependency on imported uranium had been generally constant since the 1990’s. The 
corresponding reliance on imports, as regards conversion processes and enrichment pro-
cedures, was 20% in the 1990’s and reached almost 40% in 2012, mostly due to the tran-
sition of France to enrichment technology. Moreover, another troubling issue is that now-
adays more reactors are dependent on fuel fabricated by Russia, as their design are based 
on Russian know-how. In the 1990s this was true only for Finland, while at this stage it 
also applies to Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
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Generally, uranium is considered to be quite diversified, thus secured, in terms of supply, 
despite of its high reliance and issues associated to conversion, enrichment and fuels fab-
rication. 
2.3.2.5 Renewables 
Calculating and analyzing imports and import dependency of renewables is a very chal-
lenging process, due to two major obstacles arising [5]. [First of all, feedstock used for 
biofuels can be also utilized for non-energy purposes. A typical example is wood, which 
can be used as a construction material, as raw material for furniture fabrication etc. Sec-
ondly, data regarding the input of feedstock used to produce biofuels are scarce. There-
fore, the process to calculate and analyze renewables’ dependency figures, and more spe-
cifically figures that can be directly compared to the corresponding figures of fossil fuels, 
is of significant difficulty and complexity. 
2.3.2.6 Refining 
If net imports are considered, the EU presents almost zero imports. However, this is not 
accurate, as EU is both a net importer and net exporter of refined products. The EU has 
excess in gasoline production, which export basically to North America, and shortage in 
jet fuel and diesel, which imports basically from the USA, Middle East and Russia.  
The “dieselization” of the transport sector, the decommissioning of EU refineries, that 
were described in previous sections, and shale oil production in the USA, that will result 
in less import from the EU, are expected to further deteriorate EU’s security of refined 
fuels supply in the following years. 
2.3.2.7 Electricity 
Almost all energy sources are utilized to produce electrical energy. Its dependency there-
fore depends on the corresponding import dependency of those sources and the share of 
each source in each Member State’s power generation mix. Consequently, arriving to an 
absolute value for electrical energy’s import dependency is rather difficult. 
 Nuclear and renewables accounted for 56,6% of EU power generation in 2014. With 
the first being a well-diversified energy source and the latter being practically non-de-
pendent on imports, more weight is on the solid fuels utilized in power production. 
As mentioned in the section regarding consumption, 70% of solid fuels are being uti-
lized in electricity and CHP plants. This accounts to 25,3% of the total EU power mix in 
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2014. Countries with a high share of solid fuels in their power mix and high solid fuel 
import dependency, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and 
Croatia, are vulnerable in possible disruption of electricity and heat production in the case 
of supply events of the solid fuel market. 
In 2014, 15,4% of power generation was accounted to gas. In the same principle as in 
solid fuels, countries such as Spain, Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Por-
tugal, Hungary and Lithuania, having high gas import dependency and high share of gas 
in their power sector are sensitive in gas market fluctuations. As analyzed in former sec-
tions, gas supply is more volatile than solid fuels one, making EU power generation more 
sensitive to gas shortages than solid fuels disruptions. 
Petroleum products account for less than 2% of power production in the EU. How-
ever, Malta and Cyprus are two Member States that are both almost fully dependent on 
petroleum products for their power generation(98% and 92,7% in 2014) and fully depend-
ent on imports of petroleum products.  
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3 Geopolitics 
This chapter aims to present the geopolitical aspect of energy security, mainly by analyz-
ing the case of gas, as gas is heavily promoted as the next big thing in EU’s energy mix, 
while at the same time features a distinct difference to all other primary energy sources; 
it’s highly infrastructure dependency. If combined with the general nationalization of en-
ergy resources, gas have the potential to serve as a significant geopolitical tool and used 
as political leverage. 
3.1 Geopolitical aspect of energy 
The fundamental term of energy security of supply it that it is the uninterrupted availabil-
ity on energy sources at an affordable price. However, issues such as the reliability of 
import partners, the risks related to transit counties and ensuring the investments needed 
are crucial and further develop the term of security of energy supply. The geopolitical 
aspect of fossil fuels is mainly due to the following facts: 
• they are depletable 
• they are concentrated in few regions Nine countries, with 5% of the global popu-
lation, account for 80% of the world's oil and 13 counties possess 80% of the 
global gas resources. The Middle East alone, account for 62% of oil and 45% of 
proven gas reserves [7]. 
Therefore, implications on the geopolitical level arise from numerous perspectives. 
To begin with, the majority of the fossil fuels are located in areas that are politically un-
stable. For example, three out of the seven countries that EU had officially associated 
with terrorism are big producers of oil and have major oil reserves (Iran, Iraq, Libya). 
Moreover, political events and developments in producing counties may negatively 
affect energy supply to import countries. The case of Venezuela is a typical example, with 
the nationalization of the oil sector in 2006, after Hugo Chavez was reelected, creating 
major supply issues to the global market. Another relevant example is Russia, with its 
president Vladimir Putin utilizing the vast energy resources of its country as a leverage 
to achieve various objectives and strengthen Russia’s global position. The cut-off gas 
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supply from Russia’s side to Ukraine in 2009, leaving numerous EU Member States with-
out gas for period, was a dynamic reminder of the strength Russia possesses on the EU’s 
energy security. 
This situation basically operates through the national energy companies that have re-
covered control of energy resources during the last years. While, the “Seven Sisters”( BP, 
Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Total, Royal Dutch Shell and ConocoPhilips) had control of over 
85% of the global gas and oil capacity in the 1960’s, now it is major national energy 
companies( Gazprom (Russia), Aramco (Saudi Arabia), PDVSA (Venezuela), NIOC 
(Iran), CNPC (China), Petronas (Malaysia) and Petrobras (Brazil)) that are in control. The 
conclusion remains that, as described above, politicization of energy may cause problems 
in the operation of the global energy market, as it vulnerable ideological or political am-
bition of people in charge. 
Future scenarios anticipate that internationally the demand for primary energy sources 
will rise by 36% during 2008 -2035, with the fossil fuels accounting for over half of that 
increase.  Gas request is expected to rise by 24% in the period 2005-2025 in the EU. This 
could be attributed to the global policy of lowering CO2 emissions, considering natural 
gas’s more environmentally friendly nature and the fact that it can substitute other fuels 
in power generation. Additionally, the accident in Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 
will probably contribute towards gas side, even if oil is expected to remain at the top of 
the global primary energy mix [6]. Combining this expected increase with the infrastruc-
ture dependency of gas, which requires enhanced external relations with transit counties 
and further boosts import dependency, implies the particular geopolitical dimension in 
the gas sector compared to other energy sources. Consequently, gas has been chosen as a 
case study to be analyzed, to illustrate the complexity of geopolitics in the energy sector. 
3.2 Gas geopolitical chess game 
3.2.1 Players and their interests 
This part illustrates the key actors involved with the future of the EU's energy policy, 
either due to them influencing, or because they will contribute to the gas supply market. 
It will look at every single actor on a case-by-case basis so as to verify the motivations of 
that actor as well as what role it will play in the future of the EU's energy policy, addi-
tionally to how crucial the actor will be in the grand scheme of it. 
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3.2.1.1 The European Union 
The aim of the European Commission is to enhance security of energy supply, merely 
though multidimensional energy policy. Multi-lateral policies, however, are sensitive to 
external leverage. The most significant external influence on energy issues comes from 
US and Russia. Even though the EU aims to decrease its dependency in Russian imports, 
this decrease is not expected to be significant, as massive investments already made on 
gas networks and infrastructure make it economically irrational for both sides. As regards 
the USA, it is of paramount importance for them to have access and influence over the 
world’s second largest energy market, as the EU is also one of its traditional allies. 
 Moving to internal EU, a troubling fact for the EU is that three of its eastern Member 
States, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, are ex-Soviet Union states, thus being more sensi-
tive to Russian influence, while also being totally dependent on Russian imports. This 
situation creates a major energy security issue for the EU, as an integral part of the Union 
is actually being controlled by an external EU force in terms of energy. Another issue to 
be considered that highly affects energy security is the current state and stability of energy 
transit countries which serve as pathways to energy imports. Ukraine is a typical example 
in this term, as almost all the gas pipelines supplying Europe with gas pass thought it, 
creating a major threat in cases of internal instability. The Russian – Ukraine gas dispute 
which evolved to the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 and energy-wise resulted in several cut-
offs of Russian gas, depicted how vulnerable the EU is in Russian disruptions. 
 To conclude, the EU needs to interact with both the West and the East to address the 
topic of security of energy supply and tackle critical internal issues on this term. 
3.2.1.2 The United States 
The United States in the EU energy security scheme is rather interesting, as they mostly 
play a role of monitoring EU state, rather than suppling the EU. This is mostly due to the 
fact that the US is interested in fighting EU’s dependency on Russian imports, as Russia 
is being considered a rival international player. Moreover, the close relations, both eco-
nomic and political, between the US and the EU are driving this US stance.  
Lastly, the US considers Europe as a potential importer of US shale in the foreseeable 
future, which is something that will both empower US’s place inside Europe and act to-
wards diminishing Russia’s power. In that respect, John Kery, US secretary of state, has 
stressed US’ support towards the evolution of US-EU gas trade and the EU’s need to 
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avoid Russian dependency [8]. Even though such a transition requires structural reforms 
on EU’s gas market and is not possible on the short term, it is obvious that the US is and 
will continue to be one of the major actors influencing the EU energy agenda. 
3.2.1.3 Russia 
Russia, by being Europe's greatest gas supplier, has acquired enormous financial benefits 
and influence. Even though it seems that Russia has the advantage on this relationship, it 
is argued that in a large-scale Russia’s dependence on the EU is at the same levels. In the 
case of gas disruption, both sides would lose on different levels. Moreover, the financial 
relationship of the EU with Russia includes major investments through Foreign Direct 
Investment(FDI). If such financial flows are cut, Russia could enter to a substantial crisis. 
Moreover, EU oil stock introduced by EU energy policy further push Russia’ side. 
In order to maintain its influence and benefits, Russia uses the power of its national 
gas giant, Gazprom, as well as its favorable geostrategic location to establish partnerships 
with regions that EU targets as alternative suppliers, such as the Caspian Sea area and the 
Levant Basin area. The strategic actions of Russia on these regions of interest are ana-
lyzed in the following section. 
3.2.1.4 Cyprus 
Major hydrocarbon reserves(Figure 19) had been discovered in 2011 in the Cypriot Ex-
clusive Economic Zone (EEZ), making Cyprus a special case for the EU energy security. 
The gas reserve discovered is the second biggest of the EU, estimated to be around 7 tcf 
[9]. As Cyprus is a Member State of the EU this capacity is considered to be EU’s capac-
ity, therefore enhancing the EU dependency on several aspects. Moreover, Cyprus is be-
coming a key player inside the EU and the global stage. 
 Nevertheless, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey tensions regarding the separation of Cyprus 
island and the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is solely 
recognized by Turkey, is a major obstacle on proceeding with the exploiting of the field. 
Turkey implies that the reserves also belong to the northern part of Cyprus, while no 
international recognition of this state means that is does not included in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). Therefore, there is an immediate need of addressing this issue 
through diplomatic action, as this region could prove a significant addition to the EU 
portfolio and enhance its energy security. Moreover, the means of transportation and ex-
traction have to be agreed on during the diplomatic process. 
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3.2.1.5 Israel 
Israel is a similar case to Cyprus, as major hydrocarbon reserves had been found during 
the last decade(Figure 19). Israel’s reserves(33tcf) is estimated to be able to cover their 
needs for over 200 years, 
 Israel could also serve as an additional supplier of gas to the EU, further enhancing 
the current relationship between the two sides. Its proximity to the EU and its potential 
partnership with Cyprus regarding the required infrastructure also favor such a move, 
while Israel’s geographical position ensures that it won’t monopolize specific Member 
States, like in the case of Russia. 
 
Figure 13: Eastern Mediterranean newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves 
Even so, the EU would also have to keep in mind the relationship of Israel with Rus-
sia, as Russia has already attempted to attain exclusive rights regarding the development 
and export of all LNG of the Tamar field(Figure 19). Consequently, Russian influence 
needs to be considered when forming EU’s strategy regarding a cooperation with Israel. 
3.2.1.6 Iran 
Iran is being gradually put back on the global discussions, as sanctions are being slowly 
lifted after the productive discussion outcome regarding its nuclear energy program. Iran 
has enormous amounts of gas in the South Pars field and even though Iran international 
commercial and financial activity is still progressing slowly, the possibility of Iran serv-
ing as an EU supplier is significant. This fact is further empowered if considering that 
Iran has signed a Memorandum of Understanding to supply TANAP in the future. 
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3.2.1.7 Qatar 
Qatar is the world’s biggest LNG producer, exploiting the North Field, which is one of 
the biggest global gas fields. The infrastructure for LNG is not that expanded in the EU, 
so Qatar only supplies 11% of EU’s gas supply in the form of “conventional” gas.  
 Qatar is one of the most prominent future gas suppliers, as the strategy of both Qatar 
and the EU, is to move towards LNG. Qatar’s aim is to provide 1/3 of its LNG production 
to the EU by 2030, while the EU favors LNG as it tackles the infrastructure dependency 
aspect of “conventional” gas. LNG terminal are in process of development throughout 
the EU. 
3.2.1.8 Turkey 
Turkey’s role in EU gas scheme is quite interesting, as in contrast to all other countries it 
does not supply the EU with energy supplier. Its significance is due to its geographical 
location, which can be described as a crossroad between the EU and its major future en-
ergy suppliers, such as the Caspian Sea area, Cyprus, Iran, Israel and even Russia. 
 In the following section, all areas of interest to the EU energy security are being ana-
lyzed. The fact regarding Turkey is that almost all of the EU’s new prominent energy 
supplies pass thought its soils to reach the European energy market. Consequently, even 
though Turkey is not a supplier of energy to the EU, its role has become of paramount 
importance for EU security of energy supply in just a few years.  
 This situation is fairly beneficial for Turkey, both economically, but more signifi-
cantly due to the influence that it acquires both at EU and international level. 
3.2.2 Regions of interest and geopolitical aspects 
Three regions of major importance for the future of EU energy security regarding gas 
supply are analyzed in this part; the Persian Gulf area, Levant Basin area in south-east 
Mediterranean, and the Caspian region.  
3.2.2.1 Persian Gulf area 
The relationship between the EU and Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Iraq, Iran, United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Yemen and Kuwait) had been quite stormy 
in terms on energy supply, as the Middle East Crisis of the 70s was the event that triggered 
the EU concerning security of energy supply. The area accounts for almost 40% of inter-
national gas reserves, which includes the Qatari North Field, the biggest non associated 
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gas field. As mentioned in the previous section, Qatar accounts for almost 10% of EU’s 
gas imports, being by far the largest supplier from this area, while, to compare, the re-
spective figure from African nations is 20%, depicting the state in which the EU-Persian 
Gulf energy partnership currently states. 
 Even so, considering the needs of the EU and the enormous capacity of the Persian 
Gulf, returning this partnership to its former state could potentially prove very beneficial. 
What makes this relations reflation more interesting is the fact that Persian Gulf primarily 
focuses on LNG. Figure 17 depicts forthcoming LNG terminal projects in several coun-
tries of the area, highlighting the anticipation of the area for the future of LNG. As men-
tioned before, reliable LNG supplies could help towards achieving the EU’s goals of en-
ergy sources diversification and decreasing dependence on transit countries. Moreover, 
the major capacity of the Persian Gulf could help the EU decreasing the Russian influence 
on the long term. 
 
Figure 14: LNG existing and planned projects in the Persian Gulf area 
Iran and Qatar are the two countries of the area that lead the way regarding the EU 
request for gas. What is needed form the EU stand point to develop the LNG infrastructure 
required to cope with the future demand, despite the fact that they are far more expensive 
than traditional gas pipelines. Numerous LNG gasification terminals are being designed 
in the EU, to that extend, two in Spain, two in Italy, one in France, one in Brussels and 
two in the United Kingdom. EU’s LNG imports in 2014 were about 80 bcm, with expec-
tations that this figure will be doubled by 2020. The development of this infrastructure, 
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even though being costly and requires a lot of time to be completed, will generally en-
hance EU’s flexibility on gas supply, and that does not apply only to Persian Gulf gas. 
Lastly, improving relations with Iran and pushing its economic recovery by importing 
gas, may lead to a more harmonized Persian Gulf area, creating a more stable neighbor-
hood for Europe. 
3.2.2.2 Levant Basin area 
Levan Basin area consists of the waters between Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria and 
Egypt, as can be seen in Figure 13. This area of major interest for the EU, as major dis-
coveries of gas reserves have been made during the last decade. Moreover, this area also 
includes Cyprus, which is an internal part of the EU. The reserves found between Israel 
and Cyprus accounts for more than 40tcf, with research estimating that 122 tcf more are 
being undiscovered[9]. To stress the significance of those figures, Russia, which is the 
largest country in the world and with far multiple population, holds gas reserves that are 
only 6 time bigger. The obstacles that arise towards the exploitation of those reserves are 
mainly political arguments between neighboring counties, translating to supply routes is-
sues. 
 Israel decided in 2014 that 40% of its gas reserves would be exported[10], thus a 
supply route was needed. Israel faces the issue of being a Jewish nation in a Islamic area, 
which translates to tensions in the general neighboring area [11]. Therefore, on shore 
transportation through Lebanon and Syria faces issues on security and needs to be 
avoided. Numerous pathways have been examined for the Israeli gas to reach the EU 
market, with the most possible being: 
• through a pipeline that goes directly across to Turkey 
•  a joint LNG terminal in Cyprus. 
Both scenarios require a tight partnership of Israel and Cyprus. Moreover, both options 
apply for Cyprus as well, as Cyprus is also evaluating the ways to supply the EU gas 
market with its own gas reserves 
On the case first case, illustrated in Figure 15, the pipeline would be built far across 
the Lebanon and Syria coastline, so as to avoid possible disruptions due to historical ten-
sion of Israel, Lebanon and Syria. This route commencing from the Israeli Leviathan 
field, passing through Cyprus exclusive economic zone and reaching the Turkish Ceyhan 
port requires the pipelines to be set up deep at approximately 2000metres, which is fairly 
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costly compared to a case on building the pipeline closer to the coastline. Despite that 
fact it would still cost three times less(merely $2.5 billion) compared to the case of the 
LNG port[12].  
 
Figure 15: Proposed pipeline connecting Leviathan gas field to Turkey 
An obstacle on that respect is the fact that Cyprus has claimed that it won’t allow the 
construction of the pipeline through is EEZ, unless Turkey officially recognizes the Re-
public of Cyprus and acts towards solving their 40 year conflict, which also relates to the 
exploitation of the Aphrodite gas reserves. This conflict originates back in 1974 with the 
division of the island and the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), a nation that is recognized solely by Turkey. A potential reconciliation and 
therefore move towards the construction of the pipeline would prove beneficial for all 
associated parties, as: 
• The EU would access an alternative gas supply 
• Israel would be able to supply its resources towards a major energy market 
• Cyprus would be able to use that pipeline to economically supply its gas of the 
Aphrodite field to the EU. Moreover, Cyprus could also benefit from a project of 
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Turkey to supply the TRNC with water, since water is one the basic issues of the 
island of Cyprus, with frequent shortages and disruptions. There could also be a 
possibility of trading those two such valuable resources for the area, as water for 
gas. 
• Turkey would lessen Russian influence and further empower its position in the EU 
and international level 
The stabilization of the area, due to the mutual interest economic partnerships that are 
going to be formed, should not be neglected. 
On the second case, Cyprus has been examining the construction of and LNG terminal 
in its Vassilikos port, in order to reach the EU market and avoid Turkey’s influence if a 
pipeline is to be used. However, a multibillion dollar investment cannot be justified at 
this moment, as Cyprus does not have the required amount of recoverable gas to fully 
utilize it [13]. In order for this terminal to be feasible, either Cyprus would have to dis-
cover additional reserves in its EEZ or Israel would need to participate and supply it with 
vast amounts from its Leviathan field. As regards the first scenario, Cyprus would face 
delays on exporting gas to the EU [14]. 
Another interesting factor regarding the reconciliation of Cyprus and Turkey and the 
creation of this new gas supply route to the EU, is that it is highly brokered by the US 
[15]., as one of their best interest to diminish Russian influence on this are and on the EU.  
Despite that fact, neither the EU nor the US can avoid Russian influence in this area, as 
Russia has close relations with both Israel and Cyprus. Notably, Russia has managed to 
secure exclusive right to develop and export LNG from the Israeli Tamar field. As a re-
sult, Russia would still have the power to influence EU energy scheme, even indirectly, 
despite of the EU efforts to diversify. 
The example of the Levant Basin showcases how complex can issues of energy be-
come and how geopolitics can direct their development. Levant Basin has attracted global 
interest to turn into an area in which multidimensional agreements are necessary, in order 
for its potential to be exploited. 
3.2.2.3 Caspian Region and strategic pipelines 
A third possible area for the EU to explore as an addition to its gas portfolio is central 
Asia, particularly the Caspian area, as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan possess 
large untapped gas fields [16]. Azerbaijan is estimated to produce approximately 30 to 70 
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bcm of gas annually by 2020, with the production stabilizing till 2030. Turkmenistan’s 
annual production is approximately 50bcm, but it is expected to reach even 120bcm 
yearly due to upcoming reserve discoveries. The same applies for Kazakhstan with cur-
rent 30 bcm expected to reach 90bcm till 203o Consequently, the Caspian area demon-
strates promise of being an area with adequate quantities of gas for the capital being in-
vested in its infrastructure, for each pipeline costs up to $4billion[17]. 
While the size of gas reserves in the Caspian region are pretty extensive, yet current 
gas system was designed to supply Russia and thus is controlled by Russia. In order to 
access this region this region without the Russian influence, a system of pipelines needs 
to be installed. Three pipelines were originally planned to create the so called east-west 
corridor: TAP, TANAP, and Nabucco, which are depicted in Figure 16. On the other 
hand, Russia also planned to create the South Stream pipeline, in order to avoid Ukraine 
as an unstable transit country and directly supply Europe through Bulgaria, with the pipe-
line passing through the Black Sea. These pipelines not only depict a competition of at-
tempting to reach the EU gas market first, but also a hard attempt from EU-side to move 
away from Russian influence. EU’s Nabucco was competing with all three pipelines, as 
the South Stream was overlapping its whole length, the TANAP pipeline was overlapping 
its eastern section and TAP was overlapping its western section. 
The construction of the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) was announced in 
2017 by Turkey and Azerbaijan, as a pipeline that will supply southern Europe(through 
Greece) with natural gas from the Caspian Sea’s Shah Deniz fields via Turkey. This 
pipepline, serving less countries than Nabucco, was forecasted to be more affordable than 
its competitor ( €5billion for TANAP,  €8billion for Nabucco) and was consequently fa-
vored by the Azeri gas company [18].Its construction began on February 2015, starting 
from a Kars, an eastern region of Turkey. TANAP is anticipated to be completed by 2020 
and will originally transport 16 bcm of gas on a yearly basis, with a forecast to increase 
its capacity to 31 bcm by 2026. Consequently, the Nabucco project was cut back, turning 
into the “Nabucco-West” project, in order to be supplied by TANAP and link the Greek-
Turkish border and Austria. Additionally, as mentioned in previous sections, TANAP 
may also serve the supply of gas from Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, as well as 
from the Levant Basic region(Cyprus, Israel) 
Furthermore, in 2013, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline project (TAP) [19] was selected by 
the Shad Deniz II consortium as the sole pipeline that would carry TANAP gas from the 
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Turkish-Greek border to Europe, mainly due to the fact that its route was 500km shorter 
than the one of Nabucco-West. Therefore, the TANAP/TAP project formed the new 
“Southern Corridor” and the ambitious Nabucco project was terminated[20]. 
 
Figure 16: Gas pipeline projects 
As regards Russia, the termination of the Nabucco project was a positive development 
for South Stream, however Gazprom had legal European energy policy issues to tackle, 
due to its vertical integration. In 2013 the European Commission announced that South 
Stream does not comply to the Third Energy Package [21], and more specifically the rule 
on unbundling, which require that the owners of generation, sales operators and, trans-
mission grid’s owners have to be different. In response to this development and the Com-
mission’s stance on this issue, Russia drastically altered its strategy to supply Europe, by 
jointly announcing with Turkey in December 2014 the termination of South Stream and 
the construction of the Turkish Stream[22], which would serve as the replacement of the 
South Stream. Its capacity is expected to be about 63bcm annually, while all of the gas 
supplied thought Ukraine is approximately 80bcm, thus meaning that this new pipeline is 
capable of almost fully substituting the Ukrainian pathway. Turkish Stream follows 2/3 
of the original path of South Stream through the Black Sea and then leads to the Western 
part of Turkey, while South Stream led to Bulgaria, as can be seen in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17: South Stream and Turkish Stream routes 
 What is even more important to note regarding the South Stream termination and 
Turkish Stream development, is that Gazprom will be the only supplier of the Turkish 
Stream, while South Stream would be supplied also by European companies, as ENI(It-
aly), Wintershall(Germany) and EDF(France). Therefore, the EU was left with no control 
on the Russian pipeline and increased dependence on Turkey, now serving as a transit 
country for two major gas pipelines. 
While Russia secured a victory with the Turkish Stream pipeline, the EU will still 
have a diversified supply form the Caspian area through TAP/TANAP, a development 
that will be a pillar of the future gas security of supply of the EU. As mentioned on pre-
vious sections, this pipeline could serve as a route to also supply Leviant Basin and Per-
sian Gulf gas to the EU energy market, even if this means that Turkey’s position is further 
being empowered. 
Lastly, another country that is expected to gain many benefits from these pipeline 
wars is Greece, as will serve as a transit country for the Turkish Stream. This develop-
ments is expected to both empower Greece’s position on EU level, enhance the overall 
energy security of the area, promote better relations with Turkey, as well as provide much 
needed financial benefits, as Greece is severely affected by the economic crisis. 
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4 EU Energy Policy 
Energy policy is undoubtedly one the most significant political issues today. It is funda-
mentally connected to climate change, making it not only one of the most complicated 
issues, but also one the topics with the greatest priority within the EU. In the past, energy 
policies were chiefly made at the nation state level, and even today a number of actors 
oppose more competencies for the EU. Areas of debate entail the energy mix of countries 
and how to finance future energy investment. Generally, though, the signs for a mutual 
energy policy appear to be improving. 
4.1 Policy making and associated parties 
4.1.1 EU Commission, Council, Parliament 
The EU Commission is entitled the right to introduce legislation and has, as a result, 
significant influence as it settles the agenda. Occasionally the Commission gets an order 
from the Council to prepare specific energy legislation. In the legislative procedure 
though, the Commission has very limited authority, for it may revoke a legislative draft, 
but it has no decisive word on it. The Commission is the executive body of the EU 
government and each individual policy area is headed by a Commissioner, who is 
suggested by his country’s government. Similarly to the operation of national 
governments, the Commissioner’s stance may affect significantly the final decision of the 
Commission [23]. 
During the legislative procedure the EU Council and the EU Parliament are decisive 
actors. The Council is comprised of the respective ministers (ministers for energy) from 
Member States and consequently is the EU actor with the strongest concentration on 
Member States interests [24].  In the past, the Council would make decisions concerning 
all energy legislation consensually, this brought numerous initiatives to an unexpected 
end. Following changes brought in under the Lisbon Treat, nowadays the majority of 
issues can be decided with qualified majority. The EU Parliament is the second legislative 
body in the EU and has obtained more authority over the last years, particularly under 
changes established by the Lisbon Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty co-decision, that is 
based upon the principle of parity among the Council and the European Parliament, was 
renamed the “ordinary legislative procedure”, with the Council concluding with qualified 
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majority and the Parliament concluding with simple majority. Since the new ordinary 
legislative procedure has been implemented, the Parliament has participated in all critical 
energy policy decisions. 
The EU Parliament is arranged in political factions [25], yet decisions of Members of 
parliament are occasionally also greatly affected by their country of origin. Decision 
making in the EU parliament consequently seeks a different logic than in national 
parliaments. Coalitions may be developed across faction lines; however, energy policy is 
strongly affected by political preferences. 
4.1.2 Member States, National Energy Companies, Corporations 
The Member States are the most significant actors besides the institutional EU bodies. 
They affect energy policy through their energy ministers in the EU Council and thus 
decide the “general direction” of energy policies in the European Council. Furthermore, 
the EU can merely act in areas for which the EU was entitled the competence to act by 
the Member States. Member states may not be interested in the short term to give 
particular competencies to the EU. For instance, the energy mix remains a Member State 
jurisdiction. National preferences, accessible energy resources, industrial issues and of 
course energy foreign policy all affect the kind of mix a country has. While Germany, for 
example, has concluded on terminating nuclear energy, France possesses a share of 42% 
of nuclear energy in its mix. Similarly, while the majority of countries attempt to replace 
coal with other fuels, so as to reach climate goals, Poland’s coal share is higher than 50% 
in its energy mix, for it has considerably large coal reserves. Notable energy-mix 
differences indicate differing interests. For Poland, for instance, high CO2 depletion goals 
pose a fairly bigger challenge than for the majority of other countries in the EU. This 
frequently led to its “brakeman” position in negotiations. On the contrary, some countries 
are solely reliant on one supplier (Russia) and particularly in the gas sector have become 
more anxious about their energy security than countries that are more diversified supplier 
wise. So, these countries request for more energy solidarity. This request was incorporated 
in the Lisbon Treat, bolstering energy security in the EU. 
The (inter-)national energy companies in the EU also have a significant role to play. 
Through associations they participate in the Economic and Social Committee, as well as 
in numerous European forums. Besides these activities they lobby also in other ways as, 
for instance, through direct contacts with EU MEPs or Members of the Commission. The 
“national champions”, like Germany's RWE and EON, France's EDF or ENEL in Italy, 
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also exercise influence through national channels. As the liberalization procedure in the 
energy sector is lagging, a number of national champions made a financial profit out of 
it, also improving their leverage. 
For sure, companies are, naturally, motivated by profit, leading to positions that may 
be far of what is best for EU citizens. These negative inclinations are somewhat covered 
by the action of civil society actors like environmental protection corporations. Those 
have acquired significant influence, for they provide science and data concerning climate 
change and energy issues and thus considered credible. They lobby almost the same way 
the energy companies do. 
4.2 History of European Energy Policy 
4.2.1 First steps towards collective action 
In 1951 the “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)” was 
signed, indicating the start of the integration of Europe [26]. With the installment of the 
ECSC, a shared customs union was formed. The goal was to control collectively the two 
commodities that were necessary for warfare and reconstruction alike, resulting in the 
formation of a common political interest and enhancing cooperation. Another early 
collective action was the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) [27], which occured six years later. In spite of these beginnings, European 
integration of energy policy did not advance too smoothly. The cooperation did become 
progressively closer- yet the speed of this progression highly varied. 
The 1960s were defined by a concentration on the nation state level. A push towards 
energy collaboration was initiated by the oil crises in 1973 and 1974. Consequently, in 
1974 the “Council Resolution concerning a new energy policy strategy for the 
Community” was passed, which was shortly after improved with energy goals for 1985. 
With this the Council not only highlighted the added value of close collaboration among 
Member States to tackle energy problems, but also adopted guidelines regarding energy 
supply (promotion of nuclear energy, hydrocarbon and solid fuels in the Community; 
diversification) and energy request (utilizing energy in a more logical way). 
Over the few years that followed the issue of environmental protection became more 
popular in Europe, but this did not yet reflect in European legislation, particularly as 
climate change was not yet high on the agenda.. Progression of common energy policies 
frequently came through financial routes, yet this somewhat changed with the 
-50- 
incorporation of environmental protection into the Single European Act in 1987. The 
focus, though, still lay on financial objectives, like the completion of the Internal Energy 
Market. This inclination was highlighted when the Commission was unsuccessful in their 
effort to include a separate energy chapter into the “Treaty of Maastricht” in 1992 [28]. 
Numerous Member States, particularly those that had moderately high own reserves, 
vetoed this suggestion as they did not desire to give away autonomy in that area. Neither 
the “Treaty of Amsterdam” (1999) nor the “Treaty of Nice” (2003) brought notable 
developments for a common energy policy. For that reason, the critical energy regulation 
in the following years, such as the Renewables Directives (2001 and 2003) and the 
establishment of emissions trading in 2005 were based upon environmental regulation. 
Following the adoption of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, climate change and 
consequently energy issues came strong on the international agenda resulting in a more 
favorable atmosphere for aspiring goals. More and more policy makers concluded that 
energy and climate challenges were of such proportions that solutions were not to be 
found on the nation state level, and it also made for a good common aim for the European 
Union, that aspired to take the lead in the fight against climate change. 
4.2.2 An integrated European energy policy 
It wasn't until March 2006 that EU heads of state and governments supported the first EU 
“energy action plan” The Commission's “An energy policy for Europe” strategy signifies 
the start of a more incorporated European energy policy, that gained respectable incentive 
since then [29]. The action plan pointed out the three biggest challenges for European 
energy policy, that create the core of the common energy policy till today: sustainability, 
security of supply, and competitiveness. 
In order to fulfill those goals the Commission also pointed out quantifiable aims. 
Merely two months later the response came in form of the Council Conclusions. In its 
“action plan 2007-2009” the Council adopted numerous of the Commission's suggestions, 
among them the famous 20/20/20 targets. These targets refer to three 20% goals, to be 
achieved by 2020: 
• A decrease in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels. 
• 20% of EU energy consumption from renewable resources and 
• 20% decline in primary energy utilization by enhancing energy efficiency. 
The plan entailed a spectrum of other functioning areas, most evidently the 
completion of the internal market for gas and electricity, issues regarding security of 
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supply, internal energy policies and energy technologies. The article initially states the 
“functioning of the internal market” remaining loyal to its roots, yet then presents 
numerous innovations as: 
• guarantee function of the energy market 
• guarantee security of energy supply in the EU 
• promote energy efficiency, saving of saving and advances of new and renewable 
forms of energy; 
• promote energy networks interconnection 
The most ingenious point, (b) refers to guaranteeing energy security in the EU, which 
until that times was a duty of each Member State. Energy mix, energy foreign policy as 
well as the circumstances for taking advantage of its energy resources, yet, remain in the 
hand of the nation state. Following the clear demands of the Council for an action plan 
the Commission set to operate and drafted a list of suggestions, among them the third 
“Internal Energy Market Package” (2007). Propositions had already formed directives in 
2009 regarding emissions trading, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as well as the 
promotion of renewable energies. 
Following some intense legislative progressions since 2007, currently numerous 
strategy papers are delineating energy developments on EU level, the most significant 
ones being: “Energy 2020. A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy” and 
“Energy Roadmap 2050”, the latter published at the end of 2011. “Energy 2020” is an 
extended energy strategy published by the Commission in November of 2010. It is based 
on the “energy action plan” of 2007, though notes that this strategy is not very possible 
to reach the 2020 goals, let alone the challenges on the long run, specifically the emission 
cuts of up to 95% by 2050. Consequently it focuses at providing new tools to meet the 
2020 goals. The Commission longs for creating the way for energy legislation by 
indicating the direction with its strategy papers. 
4.2.2.1 “Energy 2020. A strategy for competitive, sustainable and safe en-
ergy”  
 “Energy 2020” [30] highlights the imperative need to act so as not only reorganize the 
energy market in the EU and achieve the climate targets, but also to remain competitive 
in the future. In order for the challenges to be carried out, the Commission evaluates 
investments needs of 1 trillion Euro, particularly for (re-)constructing infrastructure. The 
Commission recognizes five areas of priority, specifically for reaching the 20/20/20 goals: 
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1) Achieving an energy-efficient Europe. Energy efficiency possesses great potential for 
more energy safety and a green economy. Simultaneously it remains a considerable goal 
that the EU is still has a long way to go in order to accomplish it. The problem started 
with an unfortunate goal designation in the first action plan (“20% decline compared to 
projected levels”) and yet the advancement in the fields continues to remain limited. 
Along other actions, the Commission wants to accomplish a breakthrough by further 
focusing on buildings and transportation, the two areas that utilize most energy next to 
energy. While success has been achieved in the industry thanks to the EU-ETS, the 
building and transport sector continues to be difficult to convert to “green” and the 
previous Directives haven't accomplished the wanted results. Thus, in June 2011 the 
Commission suggested a new proposal for a directive to challenge energy inefficiency in 
the EU. 
 
2) Completing the internal energy market. The Commission continues to work in order to 
complete the integral energy market, for the present situation leads to higher expenses for 
energy and less energy security in their analysis. A significant concentration is on the 
infrastructure projects of “European interest” that would be essential for the completion 
of the internal market, for instance for constructing grids that transport renewable energies 
within Europe from the places where it is sourced to the areas where the majority of 
energy is utilized or constructing modern smart grids that can integrate the decentralized 
generation of renewable energies and lead to energy savings. 
3) Empowering consumers and accomplishing the highest levels of safety and security. 
4) Expanding Europe's leadership in energy technology and innovation. 
5) Empowering the external dimension of the EU energy market. 
4.2.2.2 “Energy Roadmap 2050” 
The “Energy Roadmap 2050” [31] is also a paper on EU stratery, though as the name 
implies, with a longer time-frame, as “the pattern of energy production and utilization in 
2050 is already being established”. The Roadmap 2050 is a solution to the lasting 
investment cycles of energy infrastructure, and aspires at giving a direction for after 2020. 
Its Roadmap aims to provide planning assurance for investments, particularly as in the 
decade to come, a lot of infrastructure will have to be replaced. By 2050 the EU is engaged 
to deplete greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels. The Roadmap 2050 
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shall show the way to accomplish these decarbonisation goals and guaranteeing the 
fundamental targets of energy security and competitiveness. In Europe, numerous 
stakeholders elaborated decarbonization scenarios up to 2050. As a starting point, the 
Commission evaluated these scenarios, compared to a set of own scenarios and a current 
trend plus a business-as-usual scenario. The main observation of this analysis is that “a 
secure, competitive and decarbonized energy system in 2050 is plausible”, even if the 
scenarios have different focus. Generally, the Commission forecasts rising domestic 
expenditures for energy. Moreover, in all scenarios renewable energies increase 
considerably, energy savings are essential and decentralized and centralized elements of 
the power system must be interlinked. 
The decarbonization scenarios are described down below: 
• High energy effectiveness. Political engagement to very high energy savings to reduce 
energy request to 41% by 2050 compared to the peaks in 2005 and 2006. 
• Diversified supply technologies. No technology is favored; all energy sources may 
compete on a market basis with no particular supports efforts, considering public 
acceptance of both nuclear and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
• High renewable energy sources (RES). Powerful support efforts for RES proceeding to a 
very high share of RES in gross terminal energy consumption (75% in 2050) and a share 
of RES concerning electricity consumption going up to 97%. 
• Delaying CCS. Similar to the diversified supply technologies scenario yet presuming that 
CCS is delayed, leading to higher shares for nuclear energy. 
• Low nuclear. Similar to the diversified supply technologies scenario though 
hypothesizing that no new nuclear in being constructed, thus leading to a higher 
penetration of CCS. 
Based on the scenarios mentioned above the commission recognized five important 
working areas: 
 
1. Transformation of the energy system, particularly by managing the demand side (high 
energy effectiveness, specifically in building and transport; intelligent energy 
technology), advancing renewable energies and cultivating renewable heating and 
cooling in a decentralised system; and by creating conventional sources like coal and gas, 
“greener”. A substantial hope lies with the marketability of CCS, while nuclear energy is 
too a fundamental pillar in the Roadmap energy system. 
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2. Reconsidering energy markets. This aims primarily the incorporation of the internal 
energy market. Local and long-distance networks shall be incorporated as long as the 
infrastructure for high renewable usage and intelligent technology should be promoted. 
 
3. Motivating investors. The biggest part of the reorganizing of the EU energy system has 
to be completed by private investors, particularly energy companies. Only in particularly 
noteworthy cases do investments have a public good character and shall gain support. For 
the normal process the EU still has to provide incentives, such as ETS, for low-carbon 
investments. A move towards more remarkable and more tailored financing via public 
economic institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) or the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as the mobilization of the commercial 
banking sector in Member States might also aid in making the transition function. 
 
4.Promote public acceptance. The transition shall influence employment and jobs, 
demanding education and training as well as a more dynamic social dialogue. 
Mechanisms that aid workers challenged with job transitions to develop their 
employability are required and actions should be taken to guarantee pricing schemes 
remain transparent and comprehensible to final consumers. Furthermore, citizens must be 
informed and participate in the decision-making procedure, while technological choices 
have to take into consideration the local environment. 
 
5. Driving change at the global level. In the transition to 2050, Europe must secure and 
diversify its supply of fossil fuels, while simultaneously establishing cooperation to build 
international partnerships on a wider basis. As Europe's request progresses away from 
fossil fuels, and energy producers develop more diversified economies, incorporated 
strategies with present suppliers must address benefits of cooperation in different areas 
such as renewable energies, energy effectiveness and other low-carbon technologies. The 
EU should utilize this opportunity to consolidate its cooperation with its global partners. 
 
After arranging the working areas for its energy system the Commission recognizes 
ten conditions to accomplish the new system. The long term vision shall be supported by 
progressing strategies until 2030 and by putting into action the “Energy 2020” strategy 
first. The conditions as such are not new and entail present policies such as more energy 
effectiveness; more renewable energies and a totally incorporated energy market are 
essential. 
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The “Roadmap 2050” is merely a strategy and its scenarios offer various opinions as 
such. The legislation, that is, the directives that will outline the energy markets for the 
decades to follow, is still unknown. The benefit of the Roadmap is, though, that the 
Commission makes a clear declaration analyzing what it wishes to accomplish by 2050. 
It stresses that it can be achieved and that it will be considerably more affordable than the 
current strategy. A decarbonized energy system shall lead to high energy security, lower 
import reliance, lower energy prices and CO2 decline. Moreover, it shall provide 
cobenefits, such as better health conditions and quality of the air. 
4.3 Energy Security Strategy 
Following the legislation mentioned above, the EU also requires a hard-headed strategy 
for energy security that cultivates flexibility to shocks and disruptions to energy supplies 
in the short term and decreased reliance on specific fuels, energy suppliers and routes in 
the long-term. For many years to come, the Union's energy security is inseparable to its 
need to move to a competitive, low-carbon economy, consequently this strategy has to be 
an indispensable part of the overall policy for climate and energy. 
The key to enhanced energy security lies first in a more collective appeal through an 
operating internal market and greater cooperation at regional and European levels, 
especially for coordinating network progress and opening up markets, and second, in a 
more comprehensible external action. Tackling energy security in a fast-changing 
environment shall demand flexibility, capacity to adjust and change. For that reason, this 
strategy may possibly require to evolve because of changing conditions. 
In response to all these concerns, the European Commission released its Energy 
Security Strategy [31] in May 2014, which demonstrates areas in which decisions must 
be taken or actual actions applied in the short, medium and longer term to answer to 
energy security worries. Eight strategic pillars promote tighter cooperation for all 
Member States while being flexible on national energy choices, further enhancing 
solidarity. 
4.3.1 Instant actions to tackle a significant disruption during the 
winter of 2014/2015 
For the winter of 2014/2015, the Commission acted together with Member States (the 
most reliant on single gas suppliers), regulators, Transmission Systems Operators and 
operators to enhance the Union's instant preparedness with regard to possible disruptions, 
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by increasing storage capacity, developing reverse flows, advancing security of supply 
plans at regional level and to taking advantage of the potential of Liquefied Natural Gas. 
4.3.2 Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms  
The EU has an overriding priority: to guarantee that the best potential preparation and 
planning enhance resilience to unexpected disruptions in energy supplies, that strategic 
infrastructures are protected and that the majority of the of vulnerable Member States are 
altogether supported. 
4.3.2.1 Oil stocks 
Member States are required to build up and manage minimum reserves of crude oil and 
petroleum products and this should diminish the risks of supply disruptions. Current 
stocks portray approximately 120 days of consumption which is well above minimum 
demand of 90 days supply. Furthermore, the EU stockholding obligation is constant and 
connected to the oil stockholding obligation established under the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). The assurance that no physical lack of supply is possible to happen and is 
an essential element to temper market price fluctuations, should a crisis occur. The EU 
should accordingly promote further international cooperation and transparency regarding 
oil stocks and oil markets, noticeable involving important new consumers, such as China 
and India. 
4.3.2.2 Preventing and mitigating gas supply disruption risks 
After 2006/2009 gas supply crisis, the EU has enhanced its coordination capabilities so 
as to avert and reduce possible gas supply disruptions [32]. Investments in back-up 
infrastructure are now compulsory: by 3 December 2014 Member States have to be 
capable off satisfying peak request even in the case of a disruption of the single biggest 
infrastructure asset. Additionally, reverse flows have to operate on all cross border 
interconnections among Member States. There are European regulations to secure 
supplies to protected customers (for instance customers that utilize gas for heating) in 
severe circumstances, and Member States need to design Emergency Preparedness Plans 
and Emergency Response Plans. There regulations provide a European groundwork that 
creates trust and guarantees solidarity as it ensures that Member States operate on their 
national responsibilities and together improve security of supply. 
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4.3.2.3 Protection of critical infrastructure 
The EU has begun to develop a policy in order to tackle the physical protection of critical 
infrastructure which entails energy infrastructures [33]. More attention should be 
addressed to IT security. Moreover, it is essential to establish a broader debate on the 
protection of strategic energy infrastructure like gas and electricity transmission systems 
that are providing a major service for all consumers. 
4.3.2.4 Solidarity mechanisms among Member States 
The consensus that is the trademark of the EU demand for practical assistance for those 
Member States that are most vulnerable to intense energy supply disruptions. Appropriate 
contingency planning, based on stress tests of the energy systems and discussions with 
national authorities and industry, should thus be arranged and frequently inspected, with 
the aim of ensuring minimum levels of intra-EU deliveries of alternative fuel supplies to 
complement emergency stocks. 
4.3.3 Moderating Energy Demand 
Moderating energy request is one of the most effective tools to decrease the EU's external 
energy reliance and exposure to price hikes. The present situation adds urgency to the 
formerly agreed EU energy effectiveness target of 20% that will have as a result, 371mtoe 
primary energy savings in 2020 in comparison with forecasts. 
These savings can be accomplished considering the measures that have been foreseen 
in the relative legislation are applied precisely and without delays. Particularly, this 
regards the Energy Efficiency Directive [34] as well as the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive [35]. 
Accomplishing respectable energy savings is merely possible if there is a clear 
recognition of priority sectors as well as motivation of investment capital that can be 
easily accessed. Energy request in the building sector, accountable for approximately 40% 
of energy consumption in the EU and a third of natural gas utilized could be reduced by 
up to three quarters considering the pace of the renovation of building is sped up. 
Enhancements in district heating and cooling can too make a significant contribution. 
Similarly, industry consumes about 1/4 of gas utilized in the EU and there is considerable 
possibility for energy effectiveness gains driven by a bolstered Emissions Trading 
System. 
In order to bring about further investment from the private sector, which has a major 
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role to play, the European Structural and Innovation (ESI) Funds have ring-fenced a 
minimum of €27 billion particularly for low carbon economy investments, including 
energy effectiveness, which is forecast to rise to over €36 billion[36]. 
4.3.4 Building a well-operating and fully integral internal market 
A European internal market for energy is a crucial factor concerning energy security and 
is the delivery mechanism to accomplish it in a cost-effective way. Government 
interferences that influence this market framework, such as national decisions on 
renewable energy or efficiency targets or  acts to assist investment in or decommissioning 
of nuclear generation, or actions to assist major infrastructure projects, for gas for 
example(pipelines: TAP, SouthStream and NordStream and LNG Terminal in the Baltic 
Area) must be analyzed at European as well as in regional level to guarantee that decisions 
of one Member State do not sabotage security of supply in another Member State. 
4.3.4.1 Making the electricity and gas internal market function better 
The 3rd internal energy market package [37] establishes the framework within which the 
European internal market must develop. Positive steps have been accomplished in 
regional market integration. Competitive and liquid markets provide an efficient hedge 
against exploitations of market or political power by individual suppliers. Well-advanced 
trading mechanisms and liquid spot markets may offer efficient short term results in the 
event of disruptions, for it is already the case for oil and coal. The same security can be 
accomplished for gas as well as for electricity, considering that pipeline capacity and grids 
are available to transmit supplies from one place to another. 
4.3.4.2 Accelerating construction of significant interconnectors 
A genuinely integrated and competitive internal energy market requires considerable 
development of energy transport infrastructure and specifically cross-border 
interconnections among Member States. The Commission evaluates that approximately 
€200 billion are requested up to 2020 with regard to these developments. 
The Regulation on the Guidelines for trans-European energy networks together with 
the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) were created to guarantee the on-time 
implementation of the major projects Europe needs [38] along 12 priority corridors and 
areas. The first Union list of projects of common interest (PCI) was adopted in 2013. 
Six(6) projects in electricity and twenty seven (27) in gas sector have been labeled as 
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crucial for EU's energy security in the short and medium terms [39]. Approximately half 
of these projects should be ready by 2017 while the rest are planned for 2020, with most 
located in South Western and Eastern Europe. The cost of these projects is evaluated at 
approximately €17 billion. Critical PCIs are mostly large scale projects, with the 
exception of a few LNG terminals and storage projects. 
Taking into consideration the significance of interconnectors for enhancing security 
of supply and the necessity to facilitate cross border trade, the European Commission 
suggests to expand the current 10% interconnection goal to 15% by 2030 [40] and is 
willing to intensify its support to critical project to speed up their implementation. 
4.3.4.3 The European oil market 
The interdependence between the EU, US, and Russia regarding oil, the availability of oil 
stocks, as well as the ability of trading and transporting oil internationally, means that 
there is no instant threat for the EU concerning its oil supplies. As Russia is EU's biggest 
supplier of crude though, a significant number of EU’s refineries are designed for this 
specific oil, which increases reliance on Russian oil. Moreover, the refining sector in the 
EU gradually decreases its capacity and is vulnerable to investments from Russian 
companies [41] becoming less independent and competitive. Both these issues have to be 
analyzed, so as to form a relevant strategic policy for the EU oil market.  
4.3.5 Boosting energy production in the European Union 
The EU can decrease its reliance on specific suppliers and fuels by promoting utilization 
of its own indigenous energy resources. During the last decades, indigenous production 
has gradually decreased, with the renewables being the only exception. Using renewables, 
sustainable fossil fuels and nuclear energy could however mitigate this trend in the years 
to come. 
 
Renewable energy 
Increasing utilization of renewable energy saves approximately €30 billion a year, 
according to Eurostat [42]. There is a promising cost-effective potential for renewable 
heating and electricity to further decrease natural gas utilization in numerous sectors by 
the end of the decade. Worries however exist regarding its cost and the way it could affect 
the operation of the internal market. 
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Hydrocarbons and clean coal 
Exploiting conventional oil and gas in Europe should comply ato energy and 
environmental legislation, as the new Offshore Safety Directive [43]. Exploiting oil and 
gas from unconventional sources in Europe, and particularly shale gas, could to some 
extent mitigate diminishing conventional gas production, considering issues of 
environments impact and public acceptance are sufficiently addressed and a thorough 
analysis of EU’s unconventional reserves is implemented. In the case of coal, its high 
CO2 emissions mean that they can only survive in the long-term EU mix if Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technology is used. CCS can also be utilized for enhanced 
gas and oil recovery, that cannot be extracted via traditional methods. 
4.3.6 Developing new energy technologies 
The current strategy to decrease EU energy reliance demands significant alterations to the 
energy system, which on their turn require significant advances of new technologies. Both 
diversification of supply, optimized energy networks operation, mitigating energy 
demand, lowering costs, storage issues and much more partially rely on technological 
advances. A detailed analysis of the topic is addressed at Chapter 5. 
4.3.7 Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure 
4.3.7.1 Gas 
Gaining access to more diversified natural gas resource base is a priority for the EU, while 
preserving at the same time considerable import volumes from trustworthy partners. LNG 
has to be further used as an important diversification tool over the following years. New 
LNG capacity from Qatar, Northern America, Eastern Africa and Australia is expected to 
enlarge global LNG market liquidity [44], something that should be analyzed and affect 
EU’s energy policy priorities. These developments should be facilitated by efficiently 
mirroring priorities in EU external policies. Moreover, the adequate operation of internal 
interconnections and gas network has to be secured by the EU, so that gas can flow to all 
regional markets. 
Building up better relationships with current import partners is essential, however a 
versatile policy has to aim to new sources of supply too. The pipelines that form the 
Southern Corridor, which was analyzed in Chapter 3, and the corresponding projects of 
common interest are a prime example. 
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4.3.7.2 Uranium and nuclear fuel 
Nuclear safety is an unquestionable priority for the EU. The EU should continue to be the 
global leader for nuclear safety. It is accordingly essential to speed up the adoption of the 
improved nuclear safety directive [45], strengthening nuclear regulators’ independency 
and informing the public. 
Russia’s role as a major nuclear fuel producer and the fact that it provides investment 
nuclear packages has to be carefully considered, so as to avoid utilizing non-EU 
technology to construct EU nuclear plants. The latter could end up increasing EU’s 
dependence in Russian supply. The diversification of supply has to be ensured by the 
Euratom Supply Agency [46] for any new nuclear project. Of course, this also applies to 
all plant operators. 
4.3.8 Enhancing coordination of national energy policies and 
speaking with one voice in external energy policy 
Several of the aforementioned measures require the exact same prerequisite, a productive 
and efficient coordination of Member States when addressing energy issues. In order to 
meet this need, the Energy Union initiative was adopted [47]  which serves as the medium 
through which the Member States can communicate energy related issues before adopting 
them and therefore avoid potential threats on energy security of other Member States. A 
good example would be decisions on energy mix. The EU has to communicate coherent 
messages in global fora and organizations and use foreign policy instruments in a constant 
basis, such as summits with strategic partners and permanent involvement of energy 
topics in political dialogues. 
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5 Technology and EU Energy 
Security  
Action concerning innovation and research already made a significant contribution to EU 
energy security. This is notably the goal of the SET-Plan Integrated Roadmap recently in 
preparation, that shall recognize the changes needed for the transformation of the energy 
system in the medium to long run, the essential research and innovation actions, as well 
as the major drivers for innovation. As far as supply is concerned, the progression of new 
and innovative energy technologies that are simultaneously, more effective, more reliable, 
more cost-effective, and cleaner, will be supported by the Roadmap. As regards network 
infrastructure, the goal will be to guarantee energy system incorporation by advancing the 
tools to manage variability regarding the energy supply, distribution and storage, in order 
to accommodate rising renewable production and to allow more decentralized power 
generation from various sources. Finally, another important fact is, that considerable 
enhancement concerning energy efficiency, particularly in the building sector, for 
industrial application and for cities, shall be supported by the Roadmap. 
 
Indicative agreed strategic targets 
European Commission services, representatives of the EU Member States, 
representatives from industry and research, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Turkey, 
(for instance the SET Plan Steering Group) have agreed upon a list of target concerning 
different technologies in order to enhance energy security. Indicative targets are presented 
for each technology, while the full reports on strategic targets are included in each section 
in the form of references. All relative data is extracted from SETIS [48]. 
5.1 Photovoltaic Solar Electricity 
Taking into consideration the entire value chain, from raw material processing, cell and 
module manufacturing to power electronics, local storage choices and system integration, 
there seems to be an urgent demand for enhancing the cost structure and cost 
competitiveness of the European PV industry. Much potential exist for further 
development in photovoltaic devices, despite the notable developments in efficiency, 
reproducibility and reliability over the last year. Critical to those developments are 
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fabrication procedures and material properties, while on the same time, developments in 
the system architecture and operation shall promote cell efficiency. Generally, 
innovations regarding PV is mostly refers to: 
• Printed Solar Cells, as Europe's know-how on PV technology, nanotechnology 
and manufacturing can help towards reducing both capital costs for manufacturing 
plants and energy payback time 
• PV modules, as constructing materials: Multi-lateral research with the cooperation 
of the PV manufacturing, the certification bodies as well as the building materials 
industry is needed. 
Moreover, European PV research, should aid industry remain at the highest level of a 
broad range of technologies in order to achieve: 
• Efficiency, stability, lifetime and energy yield. Energy yield (kWh/Wp) should 
also be considered and not only initial capital expenditures(€/Wp) over the 
financial or technical lifetime. 
• Environmental sustainability: Manufacturing and the materials used needs to be 
environmentally friendly. Recyclability of materials is an indicative example. 
• High productivity fabrication and constant monitoring, to lower down costs   
• Applicability, by standardizing PV modules characteristic, which shall also help 
reduce installation costs. 
 
Indicative agreed strategic targets 
 Boost PV module efficiency by at least 20% and 35% by 2020 and 2030 
correspondingly in comparison to 2015 levels. 
 Decrease costs by at least 20% and 50% by 2020 and 2030 correspondingly in 
comparison to 2015 levels. 
 Boost module lifetime to 30 and 35 years by 2020 and 2025, having a assured output 
of 80% of its initial level. 
 Promote commercialization of near zero-energy buildings through integrated PV. 
Decrease their cost by 50% and 75% by 2020 and 2030 correspondingly in 
comparison to 2015 levels. 
Full report – SET-Plan – Declaration on Strategic Targets in the context of an Initiative 
for Global Leadership in Photovoltaics (PV).[49] 
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5.2 Concentrated Solar Power  
CSP technology continues to be under development, demonstrating high potential for 
technical enhancements, the main of which are: 
• Boost generation efficiency, based on increasing operating temperature, resulting 
in higher turbine efficiency. Active parabolic plants utilize a synthetic aromatic 
fluid as heat transfer fluid, which limits the cycle’s efficiency, as it cannot go 
higher than 400 degrees Celsius.  As a result, research is concentrated on finding 
alternative fluids as nanotechnology enhanced fluids, molten salt, alternative 
inorganic fluids, as well as direct steam generation.   
• Decrease solar field expenses, through new approaches on support structures, 
mirrors and receivers. Structure’s cost could decrease by reducing the materials 
and labor used to achieve optimal reaction to wind loads. Thinner, lighter glass 
mirrors could be used and heavy silver-backed glass mirror reflectors may be 
replaced by lighter, more affordable, efficient front-surface advanced reflectors. 
• Decrease internal consumption of auxiliary resources, as water and electricity. 
 
Agreed strategic targets 
 Short term: >40% cost decline by 2020 (from 2013) reflecting on a supply price of 
<10 ct€/kWh concerning a radiation of 2050 kWh/m2/year 
 Longer term: advance the next generation of CSP/STE technology. New cycles 
(including supercritical ones) with a first demonstrator by 2020, with the goal of 
accomplishing further cost declines and opening new business opportunities. 
Full report – SET-Plan – Declaration on Strategic Targets in the context of an Initiative 
for Global Leadership in Solar Thermal Electricity (CSP/STE) [50]. 
5.3 Wind Energy 
In order to reduce costs, wind turbines are advancing towards taller towers, lighter 
nacelles, larger motors, and more reliable components. Their capacity factors imply the 
need to enhance their efficiency concerning energy capture. Advances are required in 
several fields, as in materials, in new components and model, as well as in processes.  
Superconducting materials are required to be developed to use in electricity 
generators. New stiffer, lighter yet affordable and recyclable blade materials can help to 
better resist fatigue. Moreover, new blade coatings with self-cleaning potential and ice 
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shedding characteristics could reduce sand and water droplet erosion and boost UV light 
resistance. New surface treatments like PVD coatings, laser treatment and nitriding 
treatments could be utilized to enhance gear teeth properties. High loads in towers and 
foundations could be sustained through new high strength steel materials, new, very liquid 
yet of quick hardening pre-stressed concrete and enhanced mortars durable in a wide 
spectrum of temperatures. Magnets operating better at higher temperatures, high-
temperature superconducting (HTS) wire and related cryogenic materials are also 
technologies that could be utilized to improve wind power efficiency. New components 
to monitor wind turbines operation is required, as well as components to achieve a reliable 
connection to the grid, like cables, circuit breakers, transformers, switchgear, etc., for DC 
substations as well as for 66 kV AC inter-array cabling. As regards modeling, better 
knowledge of loads, electrical effects in the electrical and mechanical parts of the turbine, 
as well as load effects is of major importance. Last but not least, new procedures are 
needed for several issues, as recycling blade materials inexpensively and plan of 
manufacture, turbine assembly, transport, and establishment.  
 
Agreed strategic targets 
 Decrease the levelized cost of energy (LcoE) to (a) less than 10 ct€/kWh by 2020, and 
to (b) less than 7 ct€/kWh by 2030. 
By 2025, evolve wind energy systems that can be utilized in water >50m at a maximum 
distance of 50 km from shore with a LcoE of less than 12 ct€/kWh and by 2030, to less 
than 9 ct€/kWh.  
Full report – SET-Plan – Declaration on Strategic Targets in the  context of an Initiative 
for Global Leadership in Offshore Wind. [51] 
5.4 Marine Energy (Wave and Tidal) 
Europe is the world leader in the field of marine energy conversion technologies having 
state of the art facilities as the European Marine Energy Center (EMEC), the Biscay 
Marine Energy Platform (BiMEP) the Wave Hub and the Danish Wave Energy Center 
(DanWEC). Various marine energy technologies have been developed through research , 
however, many need to be done as this technology is in its early steps. Numerous concepts 
are yet to be tested, being the first priority of the sector. Tests have to simulate real 
conditions, while they should also upscale to array level. 
Capacity factors of marine energy technologies are at the time merely about 2000 full 
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operation hours a year. It is evaluated that this figure may be boosted to 3000 annual 
functioning hours in 2020, reaching 3500-4000 h/y in the long term, making marine 
energy competitive among other low carbon technologies. As off-shore operation and 
conservation is quite expensive, system viability also appears to be highly relevant. 
 
Agreed strategic targets 
 Decrease the LcoE for tidal stream energy to at least 15 ct€/kWh in 2025 and 
10ct€/kWh in 2030. 
 Tidal stream goals should be followed by wave energy technology at least 5 years 
late: in 2025 20 ct€/kWh, in 2030 15 ct€/kWh and in 2035 10 ct€/kWh. 
Full report - SET Plan – Declaration of Intent   on Strategic Targets in the context of 
an   Initiative for Global Leadership in Ocean Energy[52].] 
5.5 Biomass and Waste Power Generation 
Based upon thermo-chemical (gasification, combustion and pyrolysis), as well as 
biochemical/biological (digestion and fermentation) procedures, numerous conversion 
technologies exist, in different stages of development. 
 
Biomass combustion. Further progress towards low emission stoves and boiler systems 
is needed when biomass is utilized in small and medium-scale. Future research should 
concentrate on the progression of advanced control systems and better design. Stirling 
Engine technology is at demonstration phase. Technical and financial benefits for small 
plant capacities and low operating costs can be utilized moving to an Organic Rankine 
Cycle (ORC) engine, even though it presents low electric efficiency and high costs for 
particular investments. 
 
Biomass co-firing. Technical issues arise in fouling, feeding and ash disposal which 
diminish reliable and long-term operation of coal plants. Biomass co-firing with coal 
presents the lowest costs and highest efficiencies among other bioenergy production. 
Advances needed include enhanced boiler design, process control and fuel handling. 
 
Biomass gasification. Gasification is a process to convert biomass to fuel gas (syngas), 
which faces several challenges, both technical and economic. Many gasification concepts 
are available, depending on the operating pressure and the gasification medium. Syngas 
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can either be used for synthesis of biofuels, chemicals and biomethane and for production 
of heat and/or electricity. Integrated Gasification Fuel Cell (IGFC) systems with the use 
of biomass gasification-hydrogen route has high potential for energy production use. 
Most significant issues are the cost of supply of biomass and the reliability of the gasifier. 
Improving efficiency and processes for integration, as well as reducing costs and 
complexity are the next steps to be addressed. 
 
Waste. Numerous technologies are available for waste conversion, such as biological or 
thermal treatment. Steps required for energy recovery from waste are pretreatment, 
energy conversion and waste conversion. Efficient energy generation is possible through 
waste gasification with gas cleaning in syngas reforming or combined cycle applications. 
Boost of electrical efficiencies and increased heat use can boost energy recovery.  The 
heterogeneous nature of waste, the high risk for corrosion in boilers and low heating 
values consists the main issues of this technology. 
 
Anaerobic digestion. Anaerobic digestion suits a wide range of biomass feedstocks, but 
plants are limited due to feedstock availability. Biogas can be used to supply the grid or 
for final use in gas motors, if upgraded in natural gas quality. The main issues are gas 
purity requirements and quality standardization and infrastructure. Next steps required to 
enhance efficiency and costs are to increase feedstock basis, improve biodegradability, 
conversion, design and process integration. 
 
Pyrolysis. Fast pyrolysis is biomass conversion into a liquid bio-oil, gaseous and soil 
components. In order to enhance bio oil quality and use it as a fuel, pretreatment is 
required to get it to higher values. Research is required in numerous aspects, as on the 
conversion procedure, on the process reliability and control of bio-oil composition, as 
well as on the quality and the utilization of bio-oil and its thermal stability. 
 
Hydrogen from biomass. Numerous routes exist for the conversion of biomass to 
hydrogen, including chemical, biological, and thermo-chemical, at different level of 
progression and not still financially reasonable. Procedures for hydrogen production 
include: photolytic biological hydrogen; biomass conversion to hydrogen; gasification; 
pyrolysis. Photo-biological procedures are at a very early stage of advancement and have 
low efficiency in conversion. New genes of hydrogen producing bacteria and enzymes 
tolerant in oxygen have to be found, while improving conversion process and efficiency. 
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The creation of the relevant hydrogen infrastructure and safety issues that comes along 
this technology pose significant obstacles that need to be addressed.  
 
Torrefaction. Torrefaction creates solid feedstock (bio-char) of higher quality, a more 
homogeneous composition and high energy density. Demonstration projects are being 
deployed, yet no commercial torrefaction plant exists today. Fuel characteristics, as 
resistance on biodegradation and degree of torrefaation, have to be standardized. Existing 
commercial and technical issues require a further development of this technology to be 
tackled. 
 
Biorefineries. Biorefineries is a concept for the co-production of both products (feed, 
materials, chemicals, food) and energy (heat, biofuels, electricity and biogas). This 
technology is barely a concept, with its evolution depending on the technical maturity of 
different procedures in order to produce bio-based material, energy and bio-chemicals. 
 
Indicative Agreed strategic targets 
 Efficiency of at least 75% for conversion of biomass to intermediate bioenergy 
carriers by 2030. 
 Efficiency of 70% for electrolysis based renewable hydrogen production by 2030 
 Achieve a total production of 25Twh of advanced biofuels by 2020. 
 Reduce cost of liquid /gaseous advanced biofuels by biochemical or thermochemical 
processing: <50 €/Mwh and <35 €/Mwh in 2020 and 2030 correspondingly 
 Reduce the cost of renewable hydrogen: <7 €/kg and <4 €/kg by 2020 and 2030 
correspondingly 
 Reduce conversion expenses for efficient large scale cogeneration of heat and power 
by biomass by 20% and 60% by 2020 and 2030 correspondingly compared to current 
state 
Full report - SET‐Plan – Declaration of Intent on "Strategic Targets for bioenergy and 
renewable fuels needed for sustainable transport solutions in the context of an Initiative 
for Global Leadership in Bioenergy [53]. 
5.6 Carbon Capture and Storage 
CCS technology is considered to be the most prominent technologies towards moving 
away from solid fuels, especially for power generation and the need to lower emissions. 
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Despite Europe is among the leaders in CSS technology advancement, it lags as regards 
demonstration projects, with only 2 large scale CCS project located in Europe out of 16 
existing in total globally. Commercial deployment of CCS until 2030 requires assurance 
of the financial and technical feasibility of current existing technologies in integrated 
value chains. Some examples would be, CO2 transportation through pipelines and/or 
ships, its guaranteed long-term storage underground in relevant geological formations and 
of course CO2 capture from large-scale industrial facilities. 
A fruitful demonstration program will encourage the construction of innovative plants 
during 2020's, that in its turn will pave the way for a large-scale deployment of CCS in 
the 2030’s. The EU has, through the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), 
already financed €1 billion for six(6) demonstration projects. Besides the ongoing 
demonstration program, focused research will be needed in order for CCS to become as 
competitive as required to achieve the penetration described in Energy Roadmap 2050. 
The advancement of innovative capture concepts shall lead the way for the next, 
second and third, generations of CO2 capture technologies with enhanced performance, 
that shall lead to further declines of electricity expenses. Advancement of more effective 
solvent systems, as well as procedures for post-combustion capture, for instance 
improved carbonate systems and phase change and new CO2/H2 separation systems for 
integrated pre-combustion capture, moving towards next generation systems with high 
efficiency circulating fluidized bed reactors and chemical looping are some of the 
directions to which research needs to move to. Second and third generation technologies, 
that shall further diminish the investment and functioning costs, as well as the associated 
energy penalty, will be developed by pilots that will have the lead. They will concentrate 
on the testing of new/optimized solvents, membrane, sobrents, new power plant 
integration methods for all three capture ways, pre-combustion, post-combustion and 
oxy-fuel. 
Other research needs include, utilize biomass as feedstock and analyze the feasibility 
of bio-CCS. Moreover, safety and therefore public acceptance has to be improved with 
the development of concepts concerning CO2 transportation. These entail the design of 
materials appropriate for pipelines handling CO2 at different compositions, averting 
longitudinal cracking and pipeline fractures. In order to boost the safety of operations and 
contribute to the optimization of infrastructure, better assessment of storage potential and 
site characterization in required. Activities shall entail large scale storage demonstrators 
as well as pilots and development of models regarding the behavior of injected CO2 at 
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various timeframes. The advancement of more refined and cost-effective overseeing and 
modeling techniques will contribute to the evaluation of CO2 migration, fluid-rock 
interactions, cap rock integrity so that storage security can be validated. This will result 
in improved leakage detection and measurement, both in-site and by remote distant 
sensing. Lastly progression of financially reasonable technologies that can utilize 
captured CO2 as feedstock (CCUS) for chemicals and synthetic fuels production will 
further enhance the economic side of CCS. 
 
Indicative Agreed strategic targets 
 One or more large-scale CCS project in the power sector by 2020 
 One or more large-scale CCS projects supplied by an industrial CO2 source with a 
full FEED study by 2002 
 Feasibility studies on CCS deployment by SET Plan Countries by 2025-2030 
 One or more functioning Project of Common European Interest regarding the 
transportation of CO2 by 2020 
 Detailed geological storage capacity studies by 2020 
 Three or more pilot projects on new CSS technologies, one of which has to be on Bio-
CSS. 
 Construction of one Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) to 
analyze industrial CCU from various angles. 
Full report - SET‐Plan Declaration of Intent on strategic targets in the context of Action 
9   'Renewing efforts to demonstrate carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the EU and 
developing sustainable solutions for carbon capture and use (CCU)' [54]. 
5.7 Nuclear Fission Energy 
Depending on their evolutionary enhancements or developments, nuclear reactors designs 
are frequently categorized in Generation II, III and IV. The majority of the reactors 
functioning internationally are of Generation II type. In the EU-27, two Generation III 
reactors are under construction, while Generation IV plants are to be commercially set up 
around 2040. Following Fukushima, it became clear that more focus is required on 
extreme and scarce external safety hazards, therefore means to recognize these hazards 
have become a priority for research along with models that simulate such incidents. 
The majority of Generation II Light Water Reactors (LWR) stated their operation 
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during the 1980's and if they're not guaranteed life time extensions they shall be 
decommissioned during the 2020's. It is anticipated that the majority of nuclear power 
plants will expand their life time in operation to 50-60 years, so the reliable operation of 
those reactors during 2010-2030 shall require significant R&D action towards: 
• Increased awareness of ageing materials and mechanisms 
• Advancement of best practice guidelines concerning ageing mitigation and 
prevention 
•  Further evolution and verification of modern computer codes for loading 
estimation 
Generation III LWR reactors are the most advanced nuclear reactors available. Based 
upon feedback from operating experience and enhancements through R&D, the designs 
shall be further refined. Generation III reactors are currently being deployed. Three fast 
reactor concepts (Generation IV) are being developed within the European Sustainable 
Nuclear Industrial Initiative (ESNII). The French project called ASTRID is a sodium-
cooled fast reactor (SFR) and a prototype is planned after 2020 and commercial set up 
after 2040. By 2020, a pilot of the MYRPHA project of Belgium on a lead-bismuth cooled 
accelerator driven system (lead-cooled fast reactor concept – LFR) is planned and it is 
anticipated to be commercially set up approximately by 2050. Under investigation is also 
a gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), but it needs more R&D on fuel and materials, and as a 
result its commercial deployment would be farther in the future. In order for SFR and 
LFR to be commercially available by 2040 and 2050 correspondingly, various advances 
have to be achieved, such as: 
• Innovative fuels and structural materials, so as to support high fast neutron fluxes, 
high temperatures, and grant a plant lifetime of 60 years. 
• Enhanced safety, and endurance against sever damage, for instance core designs 
with moderate void effect and other favorable reactivity feedback effects. 
• Concerning future construction of Gen IV reactors, advancement of European 
codes and standards to be utilized. 
• In order to accomplish more precise and detailed modeling benefiting from the 
rise of computational power, more developed physical models and computational 
appeals. 
• Enhanced sustainability through a better utilization of fissile materials, 
diminishing of long live radioactive waste, and decrease of proliferation risks. 
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Lastly, it must me noted that another possible area in which nuclear power may play 
a role in both the heat and electricity markets, is nuclear cogeneration utilizing (Very) 
High Temperature Reactors. 
 
Indicative Agreed strategic targets 
 Clear timeframe of implementing the new Nuclear Safety Objective my 2017 from 
all Member States 
 Research on aging of structures and materials, as well as on design resistant to 
accidents, as enhanced fuels and containment new designs by 2025 
 Radioactive waste decommissioning and handling  
 Operation of the world's first deep geological repositories for used nuclear fuel and/or 
heat-generating high-level radioactive waste in Europe by 2025 
 Build on EU’s culture and knowledge on nuclear waste handling and the 
developments of the decommissioning sector by 2030. 
 Promote competitiveness and efficiency in nuclear sector  
 At least one Gen IV pilot in Europe by 2030 
Full report - SET‐Plan Declaration of Intent on Strategic Targets in the context of Action 
10: 'Maintaining a high level of safety of nuclear reactors and associated fuel cycles dur-
ing operation and decommissioning, while improving their efficiency' [55]. 
5.8 Advanced Fossil Fuel Technologies 
Gas and coal power stations will remain a major part of EU’s portfolio even if high RES 
scenario is considered, when they can act as backup in times with no supply and tackle 
sudden changes in demand. Various technologies are currently being operational, while 
new are on their way on research. Both categories are being analyzed below. 
Steam turbines for coal plants 
Nowadays, most of the European coal power stations utilize subcritical steam turbines 
that have thermal efficiencies lower than 40% (LHV). The next evolutionary step in the 
progression of steam turbines regarding coal power stations is to increase the steam 
temperature to 700 degrees Celsius, thus accomplishing a thermal efficiency of up to 50%. 
The switch from iron-based to nickel-based alloys is essential to the 700 oC technology, 
for only the latter are capable of tolerating the higher temperatures. Some pilot projects 
to try components under real life circumstances have begun within projects financed by 
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the EU and Member States like for instance the COORETEC program. The complete 
commercialization is not anticipated before 2020-2030. 
 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 
Initially, IGCC was developed for the treatment of refinery residues and not with a focus 
on power generation. Globally, merely 17 of the currently functioning 137 IGCC plants 
are utilized for power generation and barely 6 of these utilize coal as their basic feedstock, 
with relatively higher costs than coal stream turbine plants. The main objective of 
research is to display the commercial significance of this technology for power generation 
from coal. Next steps basically include the improvement of the gas turbines used, which 
at the time are not as advanced as the ones used in combined cycle natural gas plants. The 
European Turbine Network currently works at this direction, aiming to integrate the latest 
H-class gas turbines into a IGCC to achieve efficiencies up to 50%. 
 
Gas turbines and combined cycle gas turbine plants (CCGT) 
In combination with combined heat and power systems, and principally for peak power 
generation, gas turbines have been utilized for more than 50 years. CCGT efficiency back 
in 1990’s were about 55%, as the gas turbines deployed at that time were commonly about 
35%. Currently, the most advanced gas turbines have a power rating of 375 MW and 
thermal efficiencies of 46%, enabling CCGT efficiencies reach figures above 60%. The 
majority of investment projects nowadays though, utilize enhanced F-class gas turbines 
leading to slightly lessened CCGT efficiencies (58%). Research goal on CCGT is to 
achieve a combined thermal efficiency of 63% by the end of 2020. 
5.9 Electricity Networks Technology 
Electricity network is generally divided into the transmission network, which is charac-
terized by high voltage and long distances, and the distribution network of lower voltages 
and distances. Moving towards Smart Grids will require significant research in several 
areas, while most important goals are to achieve reliable supply through the transmission 
network and efficient integration of distributed generation from renewable energy to the 
grid.  As regards technology research, the following are some of the priorities that need 
to be addressed. 
• Long-distance connection technologies, with High Voltage Direct Current 
(HVDC) being one of them, HVDC, bears advantages over high voltage 
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alternating current in underwater and long distance transmission.  
• Enhanced network control technologies, as Flexible AC Transmission Systems 
(FACTS) that provide better efficiency in many levels. FACTS are enhanced 
power electronics devices that are currently being deployed in the transmission 
grid. 
•  Technologies to promote new grid and consumer-drive services, entailing: 
Smart metering, which both help distribution and producers-consumers, who can gain 
a clearer picture of their generation and consumption. Utilization of smart meters in 
combination with Demand Side Management (DSM) can help having more rationalized 
consumption 
ICT/telecom networks which are necessary for the advancement of smart grids, can 
possibly empower the capacity for fault aversion, generation control, demand side 
participation and asset management. 
• New approaches in operation, maintenance, as well as forthcoming planning. 
Innovative architectures for smart grids like active distribution networks, virtual 
power plants and microgrids is one part. Active distribution networks, entailing 
microgrids, include ICT, DG technologies, proper protection infrastructure, distributed 
energy storage, demand side management and power electronics. Black start capability 
and/or intentional islanding are features demonstrated by microgrids. Virtual Power 
Plants (VPP), on the other hand, can be separated in the technical virtual power plant 
(TVPP), and the commercial virtual power plant (CVPP). The first one utilizes resources 
either located in the same geographical region or physically linked by the local 
distribution network, while the latter incorporates resources that may be more dispersed 
by being connected for example to different distribution networks. 
Technology and procedures towards the integration of various technologies, as 
renewables and generally distributed generation, demand response, electric 
transportation, distributed generation (DG) are needed.  Other tools, for forecasting, 
management of assets and emergency response development are also required. Lastly, 
multi-lateral energy grids that interconnect gas, heat and electricity are also important. 
5.10 Smart Cities and Communities 
Smart Cities is not referred to an individual technology, but more to the promotion of a 
combination of more efficient current technologies, like ICT, transportation and energy. 
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Typical examples are nZEB (near zero energy buildings), improved heating and cooling 
systems, enhanced electrical appliances, as well as the transformation of the electricity 
distribution grids to smart grids and the establishment of electrical-based transport. A vast 
number of sensors, as well as technologies for communication and monitoring shall be 
used, which will increase the demand for data centers, data analysis systems, servers, 
cloud computing facilities etc. Enhancing energy efficiency of ICT technology has to be 
addressed at the short term, as it is anticipated to play a pivotal role in smart cities 
deployment and development.  
Smart Cities, being rather complicated systems, are expected to provide numerous 
technological challenges during their development. One of the most critical issues is 
adopting standards in order to guarantee connectivity and operability among systems and 
to encourage competition. Fruitful pilot projects that scale up through time to city scale 
pilots are also crucial for the development of this multidimensional technology. 
 
Agreed strategic target 
 The goal by 2025 is to have at least 100 fruitful examples of net zero-energy/emission 
districts (ZEED) with positive blocks (PEB), synergistically-linked to the European 
energy system, and to be able to export relevant technology that was developed in a 
large-scale. 
Full report - SET Plan – Declaration of Intent   on Strategic Targets in the context of 
an   Initiative for Smart Cities and Communities [56]. 
5.11 Buildings and Energy 
Buildings shall be acknowledged as a cornerstone of the future energy system in our 
society. A broad variety of technological solutions that can be utilized to substantially 
lessen their energy consumption currently exist. Numerous factors affect buildings’ 
energy consumption, such as their orientation and geometry, their establishments 
efficiency, as well as occupancy behavior, usage patterns and general energy 
management. While it is broadly accepted that current technologies can achieve 
considerable reduction of energy use, there are obstacles, as the vast variety of technology 
and numerous actors involved, that decelerate the deployment of such solutions. Overall, 
the energy consumption reduction in buildings consists of three actions. 
First step is to implement energy saving measures, as the building shell has a pivotal 
role on minimizing the energy needs of a building. Key technique examples on this 
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direction are designing in a way to achieve optimal orientation and low ratio of 
compactness, use passive cooling and heating, utilize daylight to lower needs for lighting, 
use the required insulation and avoid thermal bridges. Upcoming technologies, as new 
materials for insulation or ventilated windows, promise even better results. 
Second step is to boost energy efficiency of the establishments of the building and 
cover remaining needs with the use of renewable energy.  Measures like heat pumps, heat 
recovery systems and biomass boilers can help decrease the energy consumption of 
HVAC. Furthermore, the use of renewable energy, such as solar, biomass and geothermal 
could also play a significant role in buildings. Active solar thermal systems and solar 
energy electrical systems are a good example. 
Last step is to optimize occupancy behavior and usage patterns. Several applications 
for buildings utilizing smart management ICT technologies provide potential to decrease 
energy consumption and better control the balance of supply and demand and enhance 
the communication of end-used and utilities.  
 
Indicative agreed strategic targets 
 Develop holistic, standardized packages for building renovation to achieve reductions 
of primary energy use of buildings by 60%. Those packages need to be replicable, 
reduce ownership costs and lower payback time to 10years by 2025. 
 Construction and conservation expenses of near zero-energy or positive energy 
buildings have to be reduced by 10-15% compared to 2015 by 2025, through 
developing new market-ready practices 
 Average construction duration of new buildings has to be reduced by 20% compared 
to 2015 levels by 2025, through developing new market-ready practices 
 Developing new market-ready practices to lead in more precise energy performance 
anticipations both for refurbished and new buildings by 2025. 
Full report – SET-Plan – Declaration of Intent on Strategic Targets in the context of Action 
5 “Develop new materials and technologies for energy efficiency solutions for buildings” 
[57]. 
5.12 Electricity Storage Technologies 
This technology can be generally divided in large scale storage, used in transmission 
level, and decentralized storage, used in distribution level. The first one can be considered 
partially mature with pumped hydro dominating, while the latter is less developed. 
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Decentralized storage technologies development could be triggered by upcoming 
developments in consumption and distribution, as well as in the transportation sector 
moving towards electrification. Research targets regarding the major electricity storage 
technologies are analyzed below. 
 
Batteries 
Batteries are frequently deployed in electricity grids for frequency control and immediate 
actions needed. Batteries are an electrochemical based storage technology, the most 
distinguished of them being: 
• Li-ion batteries which are the most advanced rechargeable batteries. Consumer 
electronic devices broadly utilize this technology. On a larger scale, Endessa [58]  
has installed a Li-ion scheme of up to 1 MW in order to control the frequency in 
the Canary Islands. [59] 
• Lead-acid batteries, that are mostly found as car starter batteries, is a mature 
technology, that also finds its way in power grid applications. The principal aim 
of research is to enhance their lifetime and more specifically their discharge 
cycles. 
• NaS batteries utilized in stationary grids. The goal of research is to develop 
solutions that can provide frequency control to schemes of high PV and wind 
power generation. 
• Flow batteries (Vanadium Redox, Zn-Br) divide the electrolyte from the cell stack 
and as a result separate the power system from the energy capacity, meaning that 
they could be used for time shifting services. Research should aim in the addition 
of more electrolytes, boosting storage capacity and thus enabling up to 10 hours 
of discharge rates. 
 
Hydrogen 
Fundamental goals of research include feasibility demonstration and cost optimization of 
potential concepts. The research aims on the complete value chain of hydrogen. 
 
Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) 
This technology is used to power gas turbines and is based on the use of electric energy 
to compress air, store it in an underground formation and expand it while mixed with gas 
in the turbine’s combustion chamber. The aim of research is to demonstrate large scale 
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projects of CAES, as the ADELE project in Germany which goal is the development of a 
generation plant of 60MW with a storage of 3 hours [60].. 
 
Flywheels 
Flywheels are used in electricity grids, storing mechanical energy through rotating 
masses. Their capacities are normally 15 minutes and they present almost instant response 
making them appropriate for frequency control in remote or small power systems with 
not intermittent renewables’ supply. Endesa [59] have used a flywheel of 18MWs in the 
Canary Islands in combination to the aforementioned Li-ion storage scheme. [59] 
 
Other technologies 
Super capacitors, storing energy in electric fields, and superconducting magnetic storage, 
storing energy in magnetic fields, are further storage technologies. Very fast response 
times are plausible with both technologies, as they both store electricity directly, which is 
their main advantage compared to other technologies. Both are currently in early 
demonstration phase. 
 
Agreed strategic target 
 Research focus is on high resource and energy efficiency, re-configurability, 
modularity and recyclability of systems, cells and materials. 
Full report - SET‐Plan ACTION n°7 –Declaration of Intent "Become competitive in the 
global battery sector to drive e‐mobility forward" [61]. 
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Brief overview 
This dissertation outlines the multilateral nature of security of energy supply in the case 
of the EU.  
 Initially, the concept of the term is being investigated, leading to the interpretation 
most widely accepted, stating that “Security of energy supply is the uninterapted 
availability of energy resources at an affordable price”. What is important to stress is that 
all three facts need to to be met in order to have a secured energy supply, both availability, 
continuity and affordability. 
 In order to assess the security of energy supply in the EU, its current state needed to 
be analyzed, both in terms of consumption, production and imports. Fossil fuels account 
for 3/4 of its energy mix, while the rest 1/4 account to nuclear energy and renewables. 
Solid fuels had been gradually declining through the years, while gas was inclining. The 
most significant alteration of the energy mix was renewables, which almost tripled their 
share during the last decade. As regards import dependency, the data depicts that the EU 
imports more than half of its energy needs, being the world largest energy importer and 
spending more than €1billion/day on energy imports. Even if the figures of import de-
pendency of different energy sources are substantial, a closer look on their market and 
EU’s import partners is required to get to a safe conclusion. In this respect, total petroleum 
products and solid fuels, which import dependence is 90% and 55% correspondingly, are 
relatively well diversified energy sources, as their markets are global and considered to 
be relatively liquid. However, the EU portfolio of import partners is not well diversified, 
basically relying on Russia for more than 1/3 of its total energy needs. Almost the same 
applies for uranium used in nuclear reactors, which despite being almost totally imported, 
its market is relatively well operating. Gas, however, as an energy source mainly trans-
ported through fixed pipelines, is sensitive to supply disruptions, as it is essentially traded 
in regional markets rather than global ones.  
 This exact feature, along with the fact that it is heavily promoted in the EU energy 
mix, makes gas an ideal energy source to be analyzed in terms of geopolitics. To begin 
with, it had been stressed that energy has been nationalizing during the recent years, as 
most energy reserves have been passed to national energy companies. Therefore, energy 
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markets are vulnerable to ideological or political ambition of each respective politician in 
charge. This implies major issues in the energy markets, since political leverage influ-
ences market driven operation. As regards gas in the EU, several actors have their role to 
play in this scheme. While the EU is trying to diversify import partners and routes, Russia 
pushes stronger and tries to be involved in every forthcoming area of gas reserves favored 
by the EU, as the Caspian Area, Iraq, Cyprus etc. There are examples of Russia even 
exercising significant control over the energy sector of ex-Soviet EU Member States, de-
picting the dynamic of Russia towards maintaining its shares and further expanding its 
influence. The US are trying to closely monitor this Russian influence from a distant, with 
the aim of getting into the EU market with their shale oil production, in order to deterio-
rate Russian power and gain more influence on European soil. On the direction of diver-
sifying suppliers and routes, some interesting cases emerged, such as the case of Cyprus, 
with the massive Aphrodite field that was discovered in 2011, the corresponding Israeli 
reserves in the same region and the case of Iran, which sanctions are lifting gradually. 
Especially Cyprus is a major evolution on the EU security scheme, as these reserves ac-
count to EU capacity, which supports the initiative on boosting indigenous production. 
Several issues need to be addressed though, mainly with Turkey, which does not recog-
nize the Republic of Cyprus while also tries to find ways to exploit those reserves on its 
interest. Israeli gas is also facing challenges regarding the pathway that will lead to the 
European market, with a pipeline passing through Turkey with the aid of Cyprus being 
the most economically prominent option. Qatar is another partner with which the EU is 
further trying to diversify, both supplier-wise and energy product-wise, as Qatar is the 
world leader in LNG, which eradicates the dependency of gas in fixed infrastructure and 
transit countries, even though it requires major investments in the form of LNG terminals. 
Lastly, Turkey is probably the most interesting actor involved in EU energy security 
scheme on gas, as it has gained a major role by becoming the basic transit country of 
TAP-TANAP and Turkish Stream pipelines, while there is a good possibility to further 
accommodate gas infrastructure that will connect the Levant Basic to the EU market. All 
these facts are expected to further empower the dynamic external policy and relations of 
Turkey, which is something that needs to be closely monitored by the EU. The fact that a 
country not supplying energy to the EU has gained such a key role on the EU energy 
supply, solely due to its geographic location, is one the best examples on how geopolitics 
relate to security of energy supply. 
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 Having analyzed the EU dependency on imports and the geopolitical aspect of energy, 
the relevant actions need to be taken are being presented. Tackling energy security in the 
EU level requires collective actions and therefore solid policy. In this respect, approaches 
such as 2006’s “An energy policy for Europe”, “Energy 2020”, “Roadmap 2050” and 
finally the “Energy Security Strategy” were formed and agreed on by the EU Commission 
and Member States, further tackling environmental challenges as well. Historically, the 
European energy policy passed through several stages until becoming integrated, as most 
Member States were approaching and acting towards their own interest, rather than the 
Union’s collective benefit. As the energy and environmental challenges matured, it was 
made obvious than they can be addressed solely in a collective level, which led to the 
adoption of the aforementioned policy. Energy Security Strategy, which is the most sig-
nificant policy of the EU regarding energy security of supply, is based on strengthening 
solidarity mechanisms, moderating demand, promote indigenous production, developing 
new technologies, diversifying import partners and routes, build an integrated electricity 
and gas market end promote common EU external energy policy. As regards policy mak-
ing, the EU Commission is the party introducing legislation and the EU Council and EU 
Parliament are the ones deciding upon it.  Member States promote their interests through 
their ministers in the EU Council, while other parties influencing energy policy making 
are national energy companies, as well as civil society actors. 
Lastly, technology is a major part of our modern society and its role on tackling en-
ergy security issues is paramount.  Advancements on energy technology is expected to 
decrease the EU consumption and boost indigenous production in a cost-efficient way, 
thus boosting energy security. The SET – Plan, which is the relevant roadmap on tech-
nology, aims to accelerate the development and deployment of energy technologies, bring 
down their costs and find ways of financing technology projects. Several technologies are 
being analyzed, such as photovoltaic solar electricity, wind and marine energy in the case 
of renewables, smart cities and new electricity network technologies, as well as carbon 
capture and storage and nuclear technologies, in terms on the next steps need to be taken 
on research to enhance their efficiency and make them commercially viable by reducing 
their costs. In order to direct research to specific actions, certain targets have been agreed 
on for each strategic energy technology on EU Commission and Member States level. 
Indicative targets have been presented to illustrate the potential that advances in energy 
technology may unlock, the adoption of which will lead to a more energy secure EU. 
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6.2 Analytical outline in bullet points 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
• Energy is a cornerstone of every country’s economy and lifestyle 
• Security of energy supply is the uninterapted availability of energy resources at an 
affordable price 
Chapter 2 – EU Energy State 
• Consumption has been declining thoughout the last decade. 
• Final energy use is 1/3 transport , 1/4 industry and 1/4 to residential use. 
• Indigenous production has been steadily decreasing over the last decades 
• Nuclear and solid fuels account for half of the production 
• Renewables have tripled their share during the last decade  
• EU’s import dependency is 53%, thus imports more than half of its energy needs 
• 90% of petroleum products, 70% of natural gas, 55% of solid fuels used are 
imported. Diesel and jet fuel is also imported. 
• Markets for solid fuels, apart from gas, are relatively international, liquid and 
diversified. 
• Almost all uranuim to operate nuclear reactors is imported. 
• Renewables dependency is difficult to be calculated (biofuels and waste) 
• Electricity production is more sensitive to gas than solid fuel disruptions. 
Chapter 3 - Geopolitics 
• Solid fuels are depletable and concentrated in few areas 
• Their supply is sensitive to political influence since energy sources are being 
nationalized 
• Gas’s features, as being traded in region markets and being infrustructure 
dependend, make it a fitting case to be studied in term of geopolitics 
• Several countries have a role to play in EU’s gas scheme, most of them related to 
Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf  and the Levan Basin areas 
• The EU’s aim is to decrease its import dependency on Russia, through utilizing 
reserves on the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf  and the Levan Basin area between 
Cyprus and Israel. The EU tries to exploit all these reserves both by constructing 
pipelines and LNG terminals. 
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• Russia’s goal is to complete with the above routes through a direct pipeline to 
Europe, bypassing Ukraine and thus decreasing its risk, and to be involved in the 
Levant Basin area of Cypriot and Israeli gas. 
• The US are acting towards joining the EU energy market, in order firstly to monitor 
the Russian influence in the EU and secondly to export its shale gas in the foreseable 
future.  
• Cyprus, which has suddenly become a major gas reserve holder through Aphrodite 
field discovery, is trying to tackle issues regarding the routes that shall be used to 
reach the European market and addressing the relevant political issues with Turkey 
in this aspect. 
• Israel is a very similar case to Cyprus, trying to decide the optimal route of its newly 
found gas to the EU market. A cooperation with Cyprus is very possible in that 
respect. 
• Iran, with sanction gradually lifting and huge reserves of gas, has the potential to 
become a future import partner. 
• Qatar as a global leader in LNG is trying to furrher enhance its cooperation with the 
EU, while the EU is moving towards developing new LNG infrustructure. 
• Turkey is a very interesting case regarding EU energy future, as it suddendly 
becomes a key transit country of  EU’s gas supply both from the Caspian Area, 
through TAP-TANAP, from Russia, through the Turkish Stream, and finally 
possibly from the Levant Basin area, if the case of connecting to the EU market 
thourgh Turkey is favored. 
• Even though the EU tries to diversify and be less dependent by importing energy for 
several new partners, it got in a situation of being dependent on a single actor, 
Turkey, as all supply routes pass though it. This fact also points out the complexity 
of the geopolitical aspects of energy. 
Chapter 4 - EU Energy Policy 
• The EU Commisions is the executive body of the EU government which introduces 
legislation but has no decisive word on it. 
• Each policy area is headed by a Commissioner, which has significant influence in 
decision making. 
• The decisive actors are the EU Council and the EU Parliament, with the first 
comprised by respective ministers of the Member States, and the later by member 
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states political parties. 
• Member States affect decision making through their ministers in the EU Council 
• Energy companies and civil society actors also influence policy making by 
participating in associated committees and agencies and through direct contact with 
members of the EU Commission and so on.  
• EU policy walked several steps until achieving a common perspective. 
• “An energy policy for Europe” of 2006 was the first integrated approach, followed 
by “Energy 2020”, “Roadmap 2050” and finally the “Energy Security Strategy”. 
• Energy and the enviroment are closely related in EU policy. 
• Energy 2020 set goals to decrease consumption and GHG emission and enhance 
energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 and describes in detail the steps to do it. 
• Roadmap 2050 is a strategic plan to reduce GHG emission by 80-95% by 2050, 
compared to 1990 levels, based on various scenarios. It sets several goals but without 
explicitly describing the steps to achieve them. 
• Energy Security Strategy describes seven strategic pillars in order to achieve higher 
energy security 
o Empower emergency/solidarity mechanisms such as oil stocks 
o Moderate energy demand by enhancing efficiency and better use of ETS 
o Promote indigenous production through renewables and clean coal 
o Develop new energy technologies 
o Diversify import partners and routes 
o Promote solidarity among the states and adopt common external energy policy 
o Build an intrergated well operating internal market for gas and electricity 
Chapter 5 - Technology and EU Energy Security 
• Technology is a vital part of the EU energy security strategy 
• The SET-Plan Integrated Roadmap describes all the essential research and innova-
tion required on numerous energy technologies in order to enhance the EU energy 
security of supply 
• In the way of implementing the SET Plan, the members of the SET Plan Steering 
Group (European Commission services, representatives of the EU Member States, 
representatives from industry and research, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Tur-
key) have agreed on a list of quantitative and qualitative targets regarding different 
energy technologies. 
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• Photovoltaic Solar Electricity innovation is mostly around new fabrication processes 
and PV modules as constructing materials. Their standardization is also critical to 
reduce costs and increase productivity, as well as increasing their lifetime and effi-
ciency. 
•  Concentrated Solar Power Generation technology is focused on boosting efficiency 
through new fluids for increased operating temperatures. Another issue is minimiz-
ing the costs of the solar fields, mainly by new construction materials. 
• Wind Energy targets mostly refer on minimizing the levelized cost of energy. Their 
efficiency factors need to be improved, using new materials, utilizing new models 
of loads as well as new components for a more reliable grid connection.  
• Marine (Wave & Tidal) Energy also focuses on reducing the levelized cost of en-
ergy. Europe is considered to be the world leader in this field 
• Biomass/Waste Power Generation consists of several technologies, such as biomass 
combustion, biomass gasification, hydrogen from biomass etc. The targets on this 
specific field are numerous and mostly relate to increasing of their efficiency as well 
as production targets for some of those technologies. 
• Carbon Capture and Storage is considered one the most promising technologies of 
the future, especially in power generation. Research is towards next generation CCS 
plants with enhanced performance. Targets are focusing mainly on the constructions 
of pilot CSS plants, in order to accelerate this technology’s deployment. 
• Nuclear Fission Energy research and targets mainly on the development of materials 
and processes to provide enhanced safety and endurance of the nuclear plants. More-
over, research is being conducted on decommissioning of Gen 1 power plants and 
the development of Gen 3 nuclear reactors.  
• Advanced Fossil Fuel Technologies consist of several technologies, such as steam 
turbines for coal plants, integrated gasification combined cycle(IGCC), and com-
bined gas turbine plants(CCGT). Research and targets are focusing on increasing 
efficiency, through the use of new materials that can allow higher temperatures and 
utilizing the most advanced turbines available.   
• Electricity Networks Technologies also includes a handful of technologies, such as 
long distance connection technologies(HVDC), network monitor and control tech-
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nologies, as well as ICT technologies etc. The aim of the research it to develop pro-
cesses and solution in the direction of integrating all of the aforementioned technol-
ogies. 
• Smart Cities and Communities refer to a combination of more efficient current tech-
nologies like ICT and transportation. Typical examples are nZEB (near zero energy 
buildings), improved heating and cooling systems, enhanced electrical appliances 
and electrical based transport. Targets currently focus on the successful demonstra-
tion of net zero-energy/emission districts that integrate with the European energy 
system. 
• Buildings and Energy refer to broad variety of technological solutions that can be 
utilized to substantially lessen the energy consumption of buildings. Such solutions 
include insulation, passive cooling and heating, renewables, ICT technology etc. 
Targets are mainly focused on reducing costs on building construction, renovations 
and final use, as well as better assessing the energy performance of buildings. 
• Electricity Storage Technologies include batteries, hydrogen as well as other tech-
nologies. Targets are mainly based on improving their efficiency and making them 
modular and recyclable. 
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